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I.

INTRODUCTION

With respect to health, the United States is an outlier. U.S. health care
expenditures per capita have consistently been are the highest in the world,
exceeding those of the second-highest spender by more than 30%.1 Economists
attribute this gap to rapid growth in U.S. spending during the 1980s, 2 when
public programs and private insurers continued to reimburse hospitals, doctors,
and other health care providers on a fee-for-service basis, unconstrained by the
kinds of price and spending limits that other countries adopted in response to
increasing demands for resources. 3 In spite of spending about twice as much on
health care as other similarly situated countries, 4 the United States experiences
below-average health outcomes by most measures. 5 We have not kept pace with
1

Bradley Sawyer & Cynthia Cox, How Does Health Spending in the US. Compare to
Other Countries?, PETERSON-KAISER HEALTH Sys. TRACKER (Feb. 13, 2018),
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/health-spending-u-s-compare-count
ries/#item-u-s-similar-public-spending-private-sector-spending-triple-comparable-countries
[https://perma.cc/3H65-T95N] ("Health spending per person in the U.S. was $10,348-34%
higher than Switzerland, the next highest per capita spender."); Irene Papanicolas et al.,
Health Care Spending in the United States and Other High-Income Countries, 319 JAMA
1024, 1026 (2018).
2 Sawyer & Cox, supra note 1.
3 See Papanicolas et al., supra note 1, at 1034; Austin Frakt, Medical Mystery:
Something Happened to US. Health Spending After 1980, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/14/upshot/medical-mystery-health-spending-1980.html
[on file with Ohio State Law Journal] (citing David M. Cutler, Equality, Efficiency, and
Market Fundamentals: The Dynamics of InternationalMedical-CareReform, 40 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 881 (2002)); Gerard F. Anderson et al., It's the Prices, Stupid: Why the United
States Is So Diferentfrom Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89, 102 (2003).
4 Papanicolas et al., supra note 1, at 1027.
5
See Bradley Sawyer & Selena Gonzales, How Does the Quality of the U.S.
HealthcareSystem Compare to Other Countries?, PETERSON-KAISER HEALTH SYs. TRACKER

(May 22, 2017), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/quality-u-s-health
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the life expectancy gains seen in similarly wealthy countries, a gap some experts
attribute to high spending on health care relative to other social programs (such
as early childhood education, housing and nutrition assistance, and income
6
support) that play a greater role in determining health outcomes.
At about the same time that medicine began to offer interventions that made
a meaningful difference in health outcomes, the costs of illness and the risk of
high medical expenses became too great for all but the wealthiest families to
bear. 7 In other countries, the solution was collective financing-either through
taxing and spending to support a publicly financed single-payer system or
mandatory participation in private insurance funds that cross-subsidize each
other to spread risk and process claims via a unified (also known as single pipe)
system. 8 Single-payer and single-pipe systems embody collective action to
secure health care access as a public good. In the United States, however, a free
market approach prevailed. 9 Health care providers organized themselves into
prepaid Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans purchased directly by individuals and
families'o and by employers who had begun to offer comprehensive health
coverage to workers. 1 ' Commercial insurance companies also entered the
market.12 Private health insurance was heavily subsidized for most U.S.
residents, albeit indirectly, via tax laws that exempted health care benefits from
payroll and income taxes. 13 This tax subsidy remains largely hidden from view
and insulated from the political attacks leveled against more direct government
financing.1 4 Moreover, the exemption of health benefits from taxable income
care-system-compare-countries/? sft category-quality-of-care#item-start
[https://perma.cc/XGM6-NPAW].
6 Frakt, supra note 3 (citing Peter A. Muennig & Sherry Al. Glied, What Changes in
Survival Rates Tell Us About U.S. Health Care, 29 HEALTH AFF. 2105 (2010)); Andrew
Fenelon et al., Major Causes of Injury Death and the Life Expectancy Gap Between the
United States and Other High-Income Countries, 315 JAMA 609, 609-10 (2016); JENNIFER
RUBIN ET AL., RAND CORP., ARE BETER HEALTH OUTCOMES RELATED TO SOCIAL
EXPENDITURE? A CROSS-NATIONAL EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL EXPENDITURE AND

POPULATION HEALTH MEASURES 42 (2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research-reports/
RR1252.html [https://perma.cc/B3FJ-J4AY].
7

See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 236

(1982).

8

See id at 237-40; Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can't We Do What They Do?
National Health Reform Abroad, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 433, 433-35 (2004); WILLIAM C.
HSIAO ET AL., ACT 128 HEALTH SYSTEM REFORM DESIGN: ACIIEVING AFFORDABLE
UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE IN VERMONT 35, 170 (2011).

9See STARR, supra note 7, at 240-42 (describing the failure of social insurance and
rise of private commercial insurance in the United States).
IOld at 294-98.
11 Id. at 310-15.
12
1d. at 327-31.
13

TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT?: THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC
HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 78-80 (2003).

14Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Health Care and the Myth of Self-Reliance,
57 B.C.L. REV. 1, 16-17, 21 (2016).
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disproportionately benefits higher income households, exacerbating economic
health disparities.15
Three main groups were left out of this market-driven private insurance
system-people of retirement age, people with disabilities, and people living in
low-income households. 16 In 1965, the federal government created Medicare
and Medicaid17 to soak up risks that the private insurance market could not
bear.' 8 Eligibility was limited, and government administrators took a largely
hands-off approach to prices and utilization, eschewing the negotiating power
publicly financed programs elsewhere in the world exert to check provider
demands for higher prices. 19 The fragmentary mix of publicly and privately
financed coverage also allows private insurers to reap substantial profits while
requiring health care providers to navigate the requirements of multiple payers,
resulting in much higher administrative costs in the United States. 20
Federal initiatives under the Affordable Care Act of 2012 (ACA) 2 1and the
Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA) 22 are
chipping away at the margins of our dysfunctional health care system. The ACA
expands eligibility for publicly financed coverage under Medicaid, subsidizes
the cost of directly purchased private insurance through premium assistance tax
credits, strengthens cross-subsidies in the direct-purchase insurance market, and
adopts various reimbursement reforms (expanded by MACRA) that reward
providers for better outcomes.
Most other countries in the world have made commitments to respect,
protect, and fulfill the health-related needs of their populations through
international human rights instruments and national constitutional provisions. 23
In the United States, health care remains first and foremost an economic good
financed through a fragmentary system of publicly financed plans, public
subsidies for the purchase of private coverage, and private coverage provided as
a benefit of employment. 24 Access to comprehensive clinical care and good
health outcomes are among the prizes for doing well financially. 2 5 Private
15 Id. at 21.
16 JOST, supra note 13, at 85-86.
17
See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965);
JOST, supra note 13, at 85-86.
18 See JOST, supranote 13, at 85-86.

19 See generally Anderson et al., supra note 3.
Papanicolas et al., supra note 1, at 1025, 1030; Frakt, supra note 3.
21 The Affordable Care Act consists of both the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), and the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.
22
Pub. L. No. 114-10, 129 Stat. 87 (2015).
23
See generally U.N. CESCR, General Comment No. 14 (2000): The Right to the
Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Socialand CulturalRights) (Aug. 11, 2000), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/
425041/files/EC.12_2000_4-EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BG3B-2BZD].
24
See JOST, supra note 13, at 78-80.
25
20

See STARR, supra note 7, at 236.
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insurers assert their interest in community prevention, 2 6 but because most
individuals will transition among various payers over the course of their lives,
27
insurers' incentives are not well aligned with farsighted prevention goals.
Private insurers and employers use the rhetoric of personal responsibility for
health and wellness to shift costs to individuals and families. 2 8 Health justice,
including affordable access to high-quality health care and healthy living
conditions for all, is derided as the pie in the sky dream of far-left progressives.2 9
What role can progressive states play in making health justice a reality? At
a time when the Trump Administration and the Republican majority in Congress
are undermining the fragile gains of the ACA through partial repeal and
litigation while simultaneously attacking older federal commitments embodied
in the Medicaid program, 30 state governments are facing tough choices. This
article describes three basic strategies states are exploring for achieving
universal access to high-quality health care and better health outcomes for their
residents. First, maximizing eligibility for Medicaid using matching federal
funds. Second, taking up the mantle of Obamacare by adopting state-level
replacements for provisions that federal lawmakers repeal, subsidizing and
regulating the price of private insurance, and making more affordable coverage
available for purchase on state-run health insurance exchanges. Third, I focus
particularly on the efforts of states to succeed where federal reformers have
failed by adopting a state-level public option or single-payer health care system.
Although state-level public-option and single-payer health plans face significant
obstacles, many believe they are more feasible than federal reforms. Moreover,
I argue, state-level single-payer health care may be preferable from a health
justice perspective because it holds greater promise for integrating health care,
public health, and social safety net program goals to achieve better health for
all. State lawmakers must proceed cautiously, however, particularly with respect
to ensuring that people entitled to traditional Medicaid benefits, which offer
special coverage for special populations, continue to receive them. Additionally,
state lawmakers should carefully assess the role that privatized public coverage
26

See Jessica Mantel, Tackling the Social Determinants ofHealth: A CentralRole for
33 GA. ST. U.L. REv. 217, 274, 280 (2017).
Providers,
27
Lindsay F. Wiley, Access to Health Care as an Incentive for Healthy Behavior?An
Assessment of the Affordable Care Act's PersonalResponsibilityfor Wellness Reforms, II
L. REv. 635, 640 (2014).
IND. HEALTH
28
Id at 639.
29
See Lindsay F. Wiley, From Patient Rights to Health Justice: Securing the Public's
Interest in Affordable, High-Quality Health Care, 37 CARDOzO L. REv. 833, 874 (2016)
[hereinafter Wiley, PatientRights].
30
See Graham-Cassidy-Heller-Johnson Amendment, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. (2017);
see also KAISER FAM. FOUND., Summary of Graham-Cassidy-Heller-JohnsonAmendment
(Sept. 2017), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Summary-of-Graham-Cassidy-Heller-JohnsonAmendment [https://perma.cc/BXY2-3NFA] (stating that, among other things, the
Amendment seeks to "[r]epeal ACA mandates and premium and cost sharing subsidies,"
limit growth in federal Medicaid spending, "[a]dd a state option to require work as a
condition of Medicaid eligibility," and "[r]epeal several ACA revenue provisions").
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currently plays in their health systems and what role, if any, it should play in
public-option or single-payer reforms.
I begin in Part I by describing the legal framework that governs state options
for maximizing Medicaid eligibility with matching federal funds while
managing the longstanding trend toward Medicaid privatization. In Part II, I
discuss state options for strengthening implementation of the fragmentary but
universal coverage approach adopted in the ACA, including by offering a statelevel public option. In Part III, I turn to single-payer proposals. Finally, in Part
IV, I assess state health-reform options from a health justice perspective,
arguing that state-level single-payer financing has many advantages over the
alternatives. Throughout this Article, I identify and offer a preliminary
assessment of several open questions of law, particularly with respect to federal
preemption of state authority to regulate employer-based insurance under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 3 1 and the necessity and
availability of administrative waivers under Medicaid, Medicare, and the ACA.
My goal is not to resolve every one of these issues in a single article. Rather,
my aim is to map the issues and argue that health law and policy scholars should
continue to study them in detail given the benefits that could flow from pursuing
a more radical health reform agenda at the state level.
II.

MAXIMIZING MEDICAID COVERAGE UNDER EXISTING FEDERAL
RULES

Medicaid provides publicly financed coverage for people living in lowincome households who meet additional eligibility requirements. 32 Together
with the Children's Health Insurance Program 33 (which provides additional
federal funding to states with fewer strings attached), Medicaid currently covers
nearly 74 million Americans, most of whom are children. 34 It is jointly financed
by the federal government and the states. 35 Each state must make important
3129 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012).
32

ELICIA J. HERZ ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32277, How MEDICAID WORKS:
PROGRAM BASICS 1-2 (2006).
33

See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997);
Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-10, 129 Stat. 87
(2015).
34
May 2018 Medicaid & CHIP Enrollment Data Highlights, MEDICAID.GOV,
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/program-information/medicaid-and-chip-enrollmentdata/report-highlights/index.html [https://perma.cc/YPD4-SQZ4].
35 For 2016, the federal share of Medicaid costs was about 63% overall, varying from
nearly 80% in Kentucky to about 50% in Virginia. See FederalandState Share of Medicaid
Spending, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/federalstateshare-of-spending/ [https://perma.cc/Z22V-US4J]. Each state's Federal Medical Assistance
Percentage (FMAP), determined by the state's average income, applies to most Medicaid
spending. Certain benefits (e.g., family planning) and recipients (e.g., Native Americans,
ACA newly eligibles) are covered by higher match rates. See FederalMedical Assistance
Percentage

(FMAP)

for

Medicaid

and

Multiplier,

KAISER

FAM.

FOUND.,
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choices about who is eligible, which goods and services are covered, and how
providers are paid. States may pursue their health reform goals by taking
advantage of statutory flexibility, administrative waivers, and contracts that
incentivize health care providers to control costs.
A. ExpandingEligibility Through OptionalStatutory Categoriesand
Administrative Waivers
Medicaid eligibility is determined by a mix of categories that states must
cover as a condition of participation in the program (mandatory categories) and
additional categories that a state may cover with matching federal funds if it
wishes to do so (optional categories). 36 For example, states must cover pregnant
women living in households with incomes at or below 133% of the federal
poverty level (FPL). 37 They have the option, however, to cover pregnant women
up to 185% of FPL with the help of matching federal funds. 38 Similarly, states
39
must cover all children under the age of nineteen up to at least 133% of FPL,
but states have several options for expanding coverage using optional
categories. 40
States wishing to cover people or services outside of these statutory
categories must do so without federal assistance unless they receive a waiver
from the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS).41 Section 1115 of the

Social Security Act gives the HHS Secretary authority to waive the requirements
of Section 190242 of the Medicaid statute on a case-by-case basis as part of an

https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/federal-matching-rate-and-multiplier/
[https://perma.cc/2RWU-B4SR].
36
See MEDICAID AND CHIP PAYMENT AND ACCESS COMMISSION (MACPAC),
MANDATORY AND OPTIONAL ENROLLEES AND SERVICES IN MEDICAID 1, 5 (June 2017),
https://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Mandatory-and-Optional-Enrolleesand-Services-in-Medicaid.pdf [https://perma.cc/74CX-DYVJ] [hereinafter MACPAC].
37
See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(I1I), (IV) (2012); id
§ 1396a(l)(1)(A); id §1l396d(n); see also 42 C.F.R. § 435.116 (2014). Some states have
higher mandatory eligibility levels for infants and pregnant women, ranging from 150% to
185% FPL, due to the fact that they had already expanded to these levels when legislation
was enacted in 1989 to mandate coverage of pregnant women up to at least 133% FPL.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, 2258
(1989). States are required to maintain these higher preexisting thresholds. 42 U.S.C.
§ I396a(a)(10)(A)(iii).
38
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(I), (IV), (IX); id § 1396a(l)(2); 42 C.F.R.
§ 435.116(c)(1)(ii) (2014).
39
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(I), (III), (VI), (VII); id §§ 1396a(l)(1)(C), (D);
id § 1396d(n); 42 C.F.R. § 435.118 (2013) (mandating that children between ages one and
eighteen be covered, and allowing states to establish different income standards for age
brackets within that range).
40
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(I), (IV), (IX); id § 1396a(l)(2).
41 See generally id. § 1396a.
42
See generally id

850
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experimental, pilot or demonstration project. 43 By statute, the Secretary must
determine that the state's proposal "is likely to assist in promoting the objectives
of [the Medicaid Act]."44 Pursuant to longstanding HHS policy, the state's plan
should also be budget neutral, meaning that it should not increase federal costs
above the level anticipated in the absence of a waiver.4 5 Eligibility expansion
waivers, unlike requests to impose harsher requirements or cut benefits, easily
satisfy these requirements. 46 But the state must carefully negotiate with HHS
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) over the baseline federal
commitment for determining budget neutrality. 47 Moreover, the HHS Secretary
has wide latitude to deny a state's application even if the statutory requirements
are met. 48 To pursue such a waiver, the state must enact authorizing legislation
and provide opportunities for public comment. 49
B. ManagingMedicaidManaged Care
Eligibility expansions via statute and waiver have often come hand-in-hand
with the rise of managed care and privatization. When people think of Medicaid,
they tend to envision a government agency paying health care providers for the
goods and services they provide to enrollees. That vision is outdated. Most
Medicaid recipients are enrolled in managed care plans, which reduce costs by
contracting with restricted networks of providers who agree to bear some of the
financial risk that enrollees will require more expensive care than anticipated
and share the savings if they require less. 50 Additional financial incentivesamounting to 3/-5% of payments in Vermont, for example-are tied to
specified quality indicators. 5 ' States typically pay a negotiated fee per enrollee,
adjusted based on health-related risk factors (capitated payment) to one or more
private insurance companies who, in turn, share their financial risk with health
care providers, giving them incentives to steward limited health care resources
carefully. 52 Vermont, however, has developed a unique approach whereby a
43

1d § 1315(a).
4 Id
45 Laura D. Hermer, On the Expansion of "Welfare" and "Health" Under Medicaid, 9
ST. Louis U.J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 235, 237 & n.11 (2016).
4 See Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, The New Health Care Federalism on the
Ground, 15 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 1, 9 (2018).
47
See id at 9-10.
48
See Id
4942 U.S.C. § 1315(d).
50
Isaac D. Buck, ManagingMedicaid, 11 ST. Louis U.J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 107, 11720 (2017).
51 Rob Houston & Jim Lloyd, Vermont's Next GenerationACO ProgramBreaks New
Ground in Medicaid, CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES (May 10, 2016),
https://www.chcs.org/vermont-next-generation-aco-program-breaks-new-ground-inmedicaid/ [https://perma.cc/9BQZ-V7ZY].
52
See Buck, supra note 50, at 111 & n.9. The number of private insurance companies
participating in Medicaid managed care ranges from zero (in the eleven states that have not
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state agency operates the only managed care plan in the state, contracting
directly with providers. 53 The state may fulfill its obligation to ensure
compliance with federal requirements solely through commitments it secures
from private contractors, which promise to adhere to specified standards in their
contracts with providers, quality assurance, reimbursement methodologies,
54
claims adjudication, care management, and other functions. In other cases
55
(e.g., Vermont), the state retains direct control over these functions. Most
states have adopted a mix of both strategies-purchasing fully privatized basic
coverage for many enrollees while retaining direct control over certain services
(especially those that tend to be high-cost, such as long-term care) for certain
56
categories of enrollees (e.g., people with disabilities).
The federal government and the states have privatized Medicaid through a
combination of administrative waivers and legislative amendments. During the
early 1990s, following major eligibility expansions via federal statute, several
57
states obtained waivers to transition at least some enrollees to managed care.
Some relied on managed care savings to expand eligibility to additional
populations while maintaining budget neutrality. 58 In the next wave of waivers,
during the early 2000s, several additional states expanded eligibility (while
ostensibly ensuring budget neutrality) by enrolling newly eligible recipients in
59
The Deficit
private plans and imposing premiums and copays on enrollees.

yet adopted managed care and in Vermont, where a state agency administers the sole
Medicaid managed care plan itself and contracts directly with provider organizations) to
twenty-three (in New York); see Total Medicaid MCOs, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/total-medicaid-mcos/ [https://perma.cc/GEL46XKV].
53
See Houston & Lloyd, supra note 51.
54
See generally Julia Paradise & MaryBeth Musumeci, CMS's FinalRule on Medicaid
Managed Care: A Summary of Major Provisions, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 2016),

https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-bief/cmss-final-rule-on-medicaid-managed-care-asummary-of-major-provisions/ [https://perma.cc/ENB3-4Z7V] (summarizing a series of
2016 CMS regulations that "revise[d] and significantly strengthen[ed]" the regulatory
framework and requirements around Medicaid managed care programs).
55 HSIAO ET AL., supra note 8, at 30.
56
Paradise & Musumeci, supra note 54; ALICE BURNS & BENJAMIN LAYTON, CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, EXPLORING THE GROWTH OF MEDICAID MANAGED CARE 2-3, 18 (Aug.

2018), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files?file=2018-08/54235-MMCchartbook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/86YC-EZPV].
57
JOST, supra note 13, at 122-24.
58

See Hermer, supra note 45, at 238-39; see also FRANK J. THOMPSON, MEDICAID
POLITICS: FEDERALISM, POLICY DURABILITY, AND HEALTH REFORM 140 (2012) (presenting

examples of states that linked eligibility expansions to managed care initiatives).
9 Hermer, supra note 45, at 238-39. Cost-sharing includes premiums (essentially a
user fee for obtaining coverage), deductibles (a predetermined amount that enrollees must
pay out of pocket before coverage kicks in), and copayments (a flat fee or proportion of costs
that enrollees must pay for specified services). Absent a waiver, federal Medicaid rules
sharply limit cost sharing. Id
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Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) 6 0 allowed states to provide coverage for specified
populations via Alternative Benefit Plans (ABPs, also known as benchmark
plans). 6 1 These plans are exempt from key provisions of the Medicaid statute,
including many of the mandatory benefit categories (e.g., long-term care and
coordination of care by social workers) 62 that distinguish traditional Medicaid
as special coverage for special populations. 63 Specified categories of Medicaid
enrollees have the right to remain in traditional Medicaid plans.6 4 Among others,
people with qualifying disabilities, people for whom Medicaid supplements
Medicare coverage, people who are pregnant and living on household incomes
up to 133% FPL, and those who are medically frail may be offered the option
of enrolling in a benchmark plan, but may not be required to do so. 65 Moreover,
children, even if they are enrolled in a plan governed by the ABP standards, are
entitled to coverage for early periodic screening, diagnosis and testing services
(EPSDT)-a bedrock of traditional Medicaid coverage. 6 6

C. Implementing the ACA's MedicaidExpansion
Prior to implementation of the ACA's Medicaid expansion in 2014,
statutory flexibility and administrative waivers had already resulted in wide
variation in eligibility rules and the penetration of managed care and
privatization from state to state. 6 7 Nationwide in 2013, a little over 70% of all
Medicaid enrollees fell into mandatory eligibility categories while the rest were
in optional categories. 6 8 In some states, such as Nevada, virtually no Medicaid
enrollees were drawn from optional eligibility categories. 69 On the other end of

60

Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006).
61 Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7 (2012).
62
1d. § 1396u-8(c); State Flexibility for Medicaid Benefit Packages, 75 Fed. Reg.
23,068,
23,068 (Apr. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 440).
63
See THOMPSON, supra note 58, at 11 (describing traditional Medicaid benefits as
extending "beyond the medical model" to encompass long-term care consisting of "personal
assistance-helping enrollees cope with basic tasks of daily living, such as getting dressed
and going to the toilet").
642 C.F.R. § 440.315 (2017).
6542 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(a)(2)(B); 42 C.F.R. § 440.315 (2014).
66
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396; 42 C.F.R. § 440.345; see also MaryBeth Musumeci
& Julia Foutz, Medicaid's Role for Children with Special Health Care Needs: A Look at
Eligibility, Services, and Spending, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 5 (Feb. 22 2018),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaids-role-for-children-with-special-healthcare-needs-a-look-at-eligibility-services-and-spending/ [https://perma.cc/YD5H-SGKL]
("Medicaid's Early and Periodic Screening Diagnostic and Treatment (EPSDT) benefit
includes regular medical, vision, hearing, and dental screenings as well as the services
necessary to 'correct or ameliorate' physical or mental health conditions.").
67
See, e.g., MACPAC, supra note 36, at 13-14.
68 See id at 13-14.
69
1d. at 3 ("[Ajlmost all (95.8%) enrollees were mandatory in Nevada."). Although the
percentage of Medicaid enrollees who fall into optional or waiver-based eligibility categories
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the spectrum, a few jurisdictions stood out as being particularly progressive in
their efforts to expand their residents' access to Medicaid, including Vermont
(with 65.2% of enrollees drawn from optional categories), New Hampshire
(51.8%), Hawaii (50.1%), Massachusetts (48.8%), and D.C. (47.1%).70
Nationwide, nearly 75% of enrollees were enrolled in managed care plans, most
of which are operated by private companies. 71 In eight states, (Colorado,
Hawaii, Idaho, Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Utah), more
than 90% of enrollees were covered by managed care. 72 In four others, (Alaska,
Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont), all enrollees remained in publicly
administered coverage. 73 Notably, the vanguard states pursuing the strategies
come from both ends of the spectrum with respect
described in Parts II and
of eligibility.
expansion
and
to privatization
The ACA's drafters sought to extend Medicaid to all nonimmigrants living
at or below 133% FPL. 74 To opt out, a state would have to forgo all of its
Medicaid funding. 75 The Supreme Court's ruling in NFIB v. Sebelius rendered
the expansion optional for states, 76 exacerbating geographic health disparities.
In January 2014, when the ACA's eligibility expansion went into effect, twenty-

m

&

is determined in part by population characteristics, it does offer a basis for comparing the
effect of state policy choices.
cumulative
70
Id at 39-40.
71 Karina Wagnerman et al., Mathematica Policy Research, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICAID MANAGED CARE TRENDS AND SNAPSHOTS 2000-2013 5,
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-informationby-topics/data-and-systems
/medicaid-managed-care/downloads/2013-medicaid-managed-care-trends-and-snapshots2000-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YUV-RWP9].
72
Id at 6-7.
73
1d Although Vermont is listed as enrolling 56.5% of Medicaid recipients in managed
care, Vermont's sole Medicaid managed care plan is publicly administered. See generally
Managed Care in Vermont, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chipprogram-information/by-topics/delivery-systems/managed-care/downloads/vermont-mc
p.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5TJ-AC7W] [hereinafter Vermont] ("[Vermont] uses a public
managed care model in which the Vermont Agency for Human Services (AHS), the state
Medicaid agency, oversees the state's Department of Vermont Health Access (DVHA),
which serves as the state's sole managed care organization .... [This] unique 'managed

care' model [is] authorized in their [Medicaid Section 1115 waiver program approved by
CMS] ... . Through intergovernmental agreements DVHA 'contracts' with other AHS

departments to provide admin and service management functions common to a managed care
organization but does not provide any direct clinical services on its own.. .. [T]he funding
flow[s] through DVAH and AHS to providers that receive funding through 'value-based
payment methodologies' that encourage quality and cost improvements.").
74 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1 0)(A)(i)(VIII) (2012).
75
See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 586 (2012) (finding the
ACA provision to be "unconstitutional when applied to withdraw existing Medicaid funds
from States that decline to comply with the requirements of that Act").
76
Id (holding that the mandatory nature of the expansion was impermissibly coercive
and thus exceeded the scope of Congress's spending power and relying on the severability
provision in the original Medicaid statute to redraft the ACA's Medicaid expansion,
rendering it optional).
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six states participated. 77 As of July 2018, thirty-four states (including the
District of Columbia) have adopted the ACA's Medicaid eligibility expansion,
and three more states are considering it.78 Medicaid expansion has become an
important political and legal issue in some states, with all three branches of
government-and the people themselves via voter referenda-playing a role. 79
In keeping with past trends linking eligibility expansions to managed care,
the ACA also increased the dominance of privatized Medicaid managed care
plans80 while subjecting many managed care plans to more stringent
regulation. 8 ' By statute, the ACA expansion population must be enrolled in
alternative benefit plans, even if the state has not previously adopted benchmark
coverage for other enrollees. 82 The ACA and accompanying regulations also
imposed somewhat more stringent regulation on benchmark plans, requiring
them to offer the same essential health benefits (EHB) package mandated for
qualified health plans sold on the state health insurance exchanges. 83 In a 2016
rule, CMS took pains to align the requirements for Medicaid managed care plans
with those applicable to the plans sold on the ACA insurance exchanges (known
as Qualified Health Plans) and privatized Medicare plans (also known as
Medicare Advantage, Medicare Part C, or Medicare Plus Choice plans). 84 This
77

See Sarah Miller & Laura R. Wherry, Health andAccess to Care Duringthe First2
Years of the ACA Medicaid Expansions, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 947, 948 (2017)
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsal612890 [https://perma.cc/42P8-A9VP].
78

See Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, KAISER FAM.

FOUND., https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expandingmedicaid-under-the-affordable-care act/ [https://perma.cc/M8QZ-HMRH].
79
In North Carolina, for example, the Republican controlled legislature successfully
obtained a court injunction to stop Democratic Governor Roy Cooper from accepting the
expansion. Mark Binker, Court Blocks NC Medicaid Expansion Effort, WRAL (Jan. 14,
2017), https://www.wral.com/court-blocks-nc-medicaid-expansion-effort/16434322/
[https://perma.cc/9QZV-JD6Q]. In Maine, a state court ordered Republican Governor Paul
LePage to implement the expansion following legislation and a voter referendum demanding
that Governor LePage do so. Rachana Pradhan, Court Orders Maine Governor to Expand
Medicaid, POLITICO (June 4, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/04/maineexpansion-medicaid-lepage-622824 [https://permacc/44S6-YEAG].
80 As of 2017, Managed Care Organizations "(MCOs) cover nearly two-thirds of all
Medicaid beneficiaries." RACHEL GARFIELD ET AL., KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID
MANAGED CARE PLANS AND ACCESS TO CARE: RESULTS FROM THE KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION 2017 SURVEY OF MEDICAID MANAGED CARE PLANS 3, 25 (Mar. 2018),

http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Medicaid-Managed-Care-March-Plans-and-Accessto-Care [https://perma.cc/8W7N-HGB5].
81 See, e.g., Sara Rosenbaum et al., Realizing Health Reform's Potential: Medicaid
Benefit Designsfor Newly Eligible Adults: State Approaches, COMMONWEALTH FUND 3-4
(May 11, 2015), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2015/may/
medicaid-benefit-designs-newly-eligible-adults-state-approaches
[https://perma.cc/W426DRAD].
82
Id. at 3; 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)(1) (2012).
83
Id. § 18022; id. §l396u-7(b).
84
1d § 1396b(m); Medicaid Managed Care, CHIP Delivered in Managed Care, and
Revisions Related to Third Party Liability, 81 Fed. Reg. 27498, 27501 (May 6, 2016) (to be
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harmonization of federal requirements could prompt more private companies to
participate in all three segments of the non-employer-based market (directpurchase plans on the exchanges, privatized Medicaid coverage, and privatized
Medicare coverage), as many companies already do. It could also be useful to
states interested in pursuing a public-option or single-payer strategy while
ensuring compliance with the requirements that govern states' use of federal
85
as discussed
funds available through Medicaid, Medicare, and the ACA,
below.
Privatization of public coverage gives private companies something to gain
from publicly subsidized access to health care. 86 It might, therefore, increase the
political viability of expansions in Medicaid eligibility, a public option, or a
single-payer plan. 87 But when voters say they approve of Medicare for All or
politicians champion a state-level public option, they probably are not
envisioning a system where private insurance companies receive capitated
payments from the government to administer coverage. Moreover, the benefits
of a single-payer system, which I will turn to in Part IV, are less likely to flow
from universal coverage provided by a fragmentary network of private
insurance companies. As Vermont's successful publicly administered model
demonstrates, states need not rely on private insurers (or give up their ability to
negotiate directly with providers) to enjoy the savings that accompany managed
care. 88
III.

STRIVING FOR FRAGMENTARY BUT UNIVERSAL COVERAGE

Prior to the ACA, states such as Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Vermont
pioneered efforts to achieve near-universal coverage through a fragmentary
combination of public and private coverage, subsidies, penalties, and
regulations. The ACA federalizes the health insurance market in some ways: by
providing direct federal subsidies and regulating private insurance in ways that
effectively mandate cross-subsidization of higher utilizers by those with less
need for services. 89 But the ACA leaves states with considerable leeway to
undermine or promote its drafters' goals. 90 In response to federal retrenchment,
several states are considering taking up the mantle of fragmentary, but universal
coverage by reinforcing individual and employer mandates, restricting riskcodified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 431, 433, 438, 440, 457, and 495); Buck, supra note 50, at 11516. 85
See infra Part II.
86
Cf Jacqueline Fox, The Private Insurance Market: Not Very Big and Not Insuring
46 J.L. MED. & ETICS (forthcoming 2018) (discussing potential roles for
Either,
Much,
private insurance companies in a federal single-payer system).
87

88

HSIAO ET AL., supranote 8, at xii-xviii.
See Vermont, supranote 73.

89See John Brooks et al., Cross-Subsidies: Government's Hidden Pocketbook, 106
GEO. L.J. 1229, 1235-38 (2018).
90
See Gluck & Huberfeld, supranote 46, at 2, 5, 20.
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based underwriting in the direct-purchase market, and supporting direct
subsidies and other measures to make direct-purchase insurance more
affordable. 9 1 Some proponents of the fragmentary strategy have proposed that a
public option should be offered to anyone eligible to buy insurance on the state
health insurance exchanges-or even opened up to broader groups. 92 The
principal legal constraint on states' ability to take up the ACA mantle is ERISA,
which preempts many state laws that relate to employee benefits.93
A. Replacing the IndividualMandate
ACA Section 1501's requirement that individuals must purchase insurance
if it is affordable for them to do so, or pay a tax penalty 94 was intended to
promote universal coverage and support the financial viability of the directpurchase and small-group markets. 95 If too many younger, healthier people stay
out of the risk pool, confident that they can enter it later when their need is
greater, the cost of insurance rises.96 As the price increases, the cycle continues.
From the outset, the individual mandate made an easy target for popular
backlash against the ACA. 97 The individual mandate survived a years-long
onslaught of litigation culminating in NFIB v. Sebelius,9 8 only to be zeroed out
in tax reform legislation passed at the end of 2017.9 Barring further legislative
action, the federal tax penalty will no longer be assessed as of 2019.100

91
See infra Part H1.
92
MANATT HEALTH, MEDICAID BUY-IN: STATE OPTIONS, DESIGN
CONSIDERATIONS,
AND SECTION 1332 WAIVER IMPLICATIONS 1 (May 2018), https://www.shvs.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/Medicaid Buyin_-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6URB-KGHV];
CHAPIN WHITE ET AL., RAND CORP., A COMPREHENsIVE ASSESSMENT OF FOUR OPTIONS FOR
FINANCING HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN OREGON 12-14 (2017), https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research reports/RR1662.html [https://perma.cc/X65W-NJWS]; see also State Public
Option Act, S. 2001, 115th Cong. (2017).
93 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012).
94 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012).
95
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012).
96
See Christine Eibner & Evan Saltzman, How Does Enrollment of Young Invincibles
Affect Premiums in the ACA IndividualMarket?, RAND CORP. (Sept. 3, 2015),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/researchbriefs/RB9812z2.html [https://perma.cc/KND9-MW
9B].
97
Jonathan Chait, The New Republic: The Individual Mandate Backlash, NPR (Dec.
16, 2010), https://www.npr.org/2010/12/16/132104465/the-new-republic-the-individualmandate-backlash [https://perma.cc/W9FA-672Y].
98 567 U.S. 519, 569, 574 (2012).
99
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11081, 131 Stat. 2092 (2017).
10 0
Margot Sanger-Katz, Requiem for the Individual Mandate, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/upshot/individual-health-insurance-mandateend-impact.html [https://penna.cc/WU4F-NPPF].
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Citing Congressional Budget Office analysis predicting that the elimination
01
state
of the federal individual mandate penalty will cause premiums to rise,
legislators quickly began exploring the possibility of adopting state-level
penalties for those who forgo purchasing insurance even though it would be
affordable for them to do so. 102 In February of 2018, The Wall Street Journal
reported that at least nine states were considering adopting their own versions
of the individual mandate.1 03 As of August 2018, however, only New Jersey,
Vermont, and Washington, D.C., had done so. 104

B. Replacing the Employer Mandate
ACA Section 1513 mandated that employers with fifty or more employees
05
must provide adequate health benefits at an affordable price or pay a penalty.
This pay-or-play mandate was intended to "discourage employers" from relying
106
on government-subsidized coverage for employees on the individual market.
Implementation has been rocky. The Obama Administration repeatedly delayed
the penalty.1 0 7 Congressional Republicans and President Trump have both

10 1 See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REPEALING THE INDIVIDUAL HEALTH
INSURANCE MANDATE: AN UPDATED ESTIMATE (2017), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/
115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/53300-individualmandate.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XKAMNHH] (noting that premiums would rise by around 10% each year).
1 02 See Jason Levitis, Model Legislation for State Individual Mandate (Feb. 21, 2018)
(unpublished legislation proposal, Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International
Affairs, Princeton University), https://www.shvs.org/resource/model-legislation-for-stateindividual-mandate/ [https://perma.cc/5D85-YCQJ].
103 Stephanie Armour, States Look at Establishing Their Own Health Insurance
Mandates, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/states-look-atestablishing-their-own-health-insurance-mandates-1517659200?mod-e2tw
[https://perma.cc/7SV9-2JQT]; see also Levitis, supranote 102; Mattie Quinn, State Efforts
to Bring Back Obamacare's Individual Mandate Stall, GOVERNING (Mar. 5, 2018),
http://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/gov-obamacare-individualmandate-tax-law-states.html [https://perma.cc/7QNS-TLQX].
104 B22-0753 Council ofthe District of Columbia(D.C. 2018); S. 1877, 218th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.J. 2018); H.R. 696, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018); see also Jenna
Portnoy, Senate Blocks Effort to Kill D.C.'s Version of Affordable Care Act's Individual
Mandate, WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dcpolitics/thats-not-democracy-senate-kills-effort-to-stymie-dcs-version-of-the-affordablecare-act/2018/08/02/246e2c94-966d-l l e8-8I0c-5fa705927d54_story.htmi
[https://perma.cc/SAC5-WUZT] (discussing the Senate's rejection of a recent measure that
would have reversed Washington, D.C.'s, version of the individual mandate).
105 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a)-(c) (2012). Employers must offer coverage that pays, on
average, for at least 60% of covered expenses and the cost to the employee may not exceed
of household income. Id. § 36B(c)(2)(C).
9.5%106
Brendan S. Maher, Unlocking Exchanges, 24 CONN. INS. L.J. 125, 147 (2017).
107 Juliet Eilperin & Amy Goldstein, White House Delays Health Insurance Mandate
for Medium-Size Employers Until 2016, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/white-house-delays-health-
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expressed a desire to repeal it.108 If the federal employer mandate is repealed or
under-enforced, could a state legislature minimize the burden of supporting
subsidies in the direct-purchase market by adopting a state-level employer
mandate in its place? The key legal question is whether a state employer
mandate would be preempted by ERISA.
ERISA establishes minimum standards for employee pension and welfare
benefit plans (including health plans), but provides relatively little in the way of
affirmative protections for enrollees in employer-based health coverage.1 09 Its
principal impact on employer-based health coverage is deregulatory.110
Section 514 of ERISA expressly preempts state laws that "relate to" an
employee benefit plan governed by ERISA. 111 Congress intended to permit
multi-state employers to offer uniform benefits without regard to regulations
that vary from state to state. 112 Employers who self-insure (meaning that they
bear the financial risk themselves rather than purchasing health insurance for
their employees) enjoy particular protection from state regulation under
ERISA.11 3 Although the statute's savings clause provides that state laws that
"regulate insurance" are saved from preemption,1 14 the statute specifies that
self-insuring employers may not be deemed insurers for the purposes of the
savings clause.115

The Supreme Court has not addressed preemption of state pay-or-play
mandates and lower court precedents are split.11 6 Hawaii, which adopted a

mandate that all employers must provide health benefits in 1974,117 sought and
received a statutory exemption from ERISA preemption.11 8 The Massachusetts

insurance-mandate-for-medium-sized-employers-until-2016/2014/02/10/ade6b344-927911 e3-84el-27626c5ef5fbstory.html [https://perma.cc/KTT2-DDRS].
108 Alan Rappeport, Trump Says He Got Rid of Obamacare. The IRS. Doesn't
Agree,
N.Y. TIMEs (May 6, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/05/06/business/trump-obamacareirs.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].
109
See Brendan S. Maher, RegulatingEmployment-BasedAnything, 100 MINN. L. REv.
1257, 1270 (2016).
110Id
111 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012). Plans governed by ERISA include all employer-based
health plans except those offered by government employers and churches. Id. § 1003(b)(1)(2).
1 12
See 514 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1995).
1 13 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2XB).
ll 4 Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
11 5 1d § 1144(b)(2)(B).
116See Samuel C. Salganik, What the UnconstitutionalConditionsDoctrine Can Teach
Us About ERISA Preemption: Is It Possible to Consistently Identify "Coercive" Pay-OrPlay Schemes, 109 COLuM. L. REv. 1482, 1482, 1484 (2009).
1 17
Prepaid Health Care Act of 1974, HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 393-11, 393-33 (West
2018).
11829 U.S.C.
1I 44(b)(5)(A); Nicholas Bagley, Federalismand the End ofObamacare,
127 YALE L.J.F. 1, 15 (2017).
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9
employer mandate component of Romneycarell was not challenged in court,
but similar pay-or-play employer mandates in Maryland and San Francisco
were. 120 In 2007, the Fourth Circuit struck down Maryland's mandate requiring
certain employers (only Wal-Mart qualified) to commit at least 8% of payroll to
employee health benefits or else pay the same amount to a state fund supporting
public coverage.121 The court found that the Maryland law "directly regulates
22
and that "a
employers' structuring of their employee health benefit plans"l
proliferation of similar laws in other jurisdictions would force Wal-Mart or any
employer like it to monitor these varying laws and manipulate its healthcare
spending to comply with them."1 23 In 2009, the Ninth Circuit upheld San
Francisco's mandate requiring employers to make health care expenditures for
124
The court found that an ERISA
their employees or pay a penalty to the city.
employer may be influenced by the city ordinance to "adopt or to change an
ERISA plan ... because, when faced with an unavoidable obligation to make a
payment at a certain level, it may prefer to make that payment to an ERISA plan.
25
The issue became moot
However,. . . such influence is entirely permissible."
126
so
the question remains
mandate
employer
the
federalized
when the ACA
mandate to require a
Hawaii's
unresolved. The fact that Congress understood
special statutory exemption bolsters the argument that, in the absence of such
127
As
an exemption from Congress, other states' mandates are preempted.
Nicholas Bagley has argued: "At a minimum, the unsettled scope of ERISA
preemption will give states pause. Why take the political hit for imposing a new
28
'employer mandate' when the courts will probably invalidate it anyhow?"

C. Restricting Risk-Based Underwritingin the Direct-PurchaseMarket
Historically, market failures, inadequate consumer information, and
overrepresentation of less-healthy prospective insureds in the direct-purchase
market drove up the cost and limited the quality of coverage available to people
who lacked access to employer-based insurance and were not eligible for public
119

An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, ch. 58,
2006 Mass. Acts 77 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the Massachusetts General
Laws).
1 2 0 See Salganik, supra note 116, at 1482.
121 Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2007).
122Id. at 195.
123Id. at 197.
124 Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City and Cty. of S. F., 546 F.3d 639, 661 (9th Cir. 2008).
125Id. at 656.
126
See Bagley, supra note 118, at 14.
1 27 See id. at 14-15. Hawaii's Section 1332 waiver to reconcile the ACA with the state's
employer mandate was approved in December 2016. MANATr HEALTH, 1332 State
Innovation Waivers Under the Trump Administration, ST. HEALTH REFORM ASSISTANCE
2
NETWORK 21 (Apr. 12, 2017), http://www.statenetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/ 017/04/
1332-Waiver-Webinar-4-12-17 _Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/95ZE-GE89].
128
Bagley, supra note 118, at 15.
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coverage.1 2 9 Additionally, people with higher expected health care costs due to
pre-existing conditions, family history, or other factors (such as being a woman)
could be charged premiums that were prohibitively expensive, offered terms of
coverage that left them with significant financial exposure, or denied coverage
altogether.13 0
Under the ACA, direct-purchase insurance plans are bought, sold, regulated,
and subsidized through health insurance exchanges.131 The ACA requires these
plans to cover the essential health benefits package. 132 All health plans,
including those in the direct-purchase market, are subject to a guaranteed issue
requirement, which prohibits them from excluding anyone based on factors
related to health status. 133 They are sharply limited in their ability to charge
differential premiums based on factors related to health status, 134 and they are
prohibited from excluding treatment for pre-existing conditions. 135 The ACA
regulations restricting risk-based underwriting-colloquially referred to as
protections for people with preexisting conditions-are crucial for many
individuals who would otherwise be uninsurable in the private market. 13 6 As
their critics appreciate, these regulations effectively bring about a hidden crosssubsidization of high utilizers (who pay a rate lower than actuarial predictions
would dictate) by low utilizers (who pay more than actuarial predictions would
dictate).137

12 9

Jon R. Gabel et al., More Than HalfofIndividual HealthPlans Offer Coverage That
FallsShort of What CanBe Sold Through Exchanges as of2014, 31 HEALTH AFFAIRS 133940 (2012); Gary Claxton et al., What Do They Mean When They Talk About Pre-Existing
Health Conditions?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 19, 2012), http://kff.org/healthreform/perspective/what-do-they-mean-when-they-talk-about-pre-existing-healthconditions/ [https://perma.cc/X7FQ-B5UA].
130 Although people enrolled in employer-based coverage have been protected from
discrimination based on health status for decades, in the direct-purchase market, risk-based
underwriting was the norm prior to the ACA. Claxton et al., supra note 129.
131 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1311-24 Stat.
120 ts. II, III (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
32 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6(a) (2012).
13 3
Guaranteed issue, community rating, and restrictions on exclusions for preexisting
conditions were already in place for group plans under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012).
13442 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1)(A)-(B).
1 3 5 1d § 300gg-3(a).
13 6
See Gary Claxton et al., Pre-ExistingConditions and Medical Underwriting in the
Individual Insurance Market Prior to the ACA, KAISER FAM. FOuND. (Dec. 12, 2016),
https://www.kff.org/health-refonn/issue-brief/pre-existing-conditions-and-medicalunderwriting-in-the-individual-insurance-market-prior-to-the-aca/ [https://perma.cc/VP6RCFYB].
137 See, e.g., Tom Miller, The Concentrationand Persistence ofHealth CareSpending,
CATO INST. 28, 30 (Winter 2017-18), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files
/regulation/2017/12/regulation-v40n4-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/88WK-SE67].
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Although the underwriting regulations are the most popular component of
13 8
If
the ACA, they are the subject of ongoing litigation and threats of repeal.
federal restrictions on risk-based underwriting are rolled back, can states step
139
no obvious
in? At least as far as the direct-purchase market is concerned,
Several
reforms.
underwriting
state-level
of
way
the
in
stands
obstacle
legal
14 1
140
of
form
some
had
already
Vermont,
and
states, including Massachusetts
ACA.
to
the
protection for people with preexisting conditions in place prior
States could face political pressure to forgo underwriting regulations out of fear
that insurers would abandon their exchanges for greener pastures. On the other
hand, the groundswell of political support for pre-existing conditions
protections triggered by Republican repeal proposals in 2017 could bolster state
legislators' political courage.

D. PromotingAccess to Affordable Direct-PurchaseInsurance
States have considerable authority to shape access to direct-purchase
insurance on their health insurance exchanges through the application of federal
subsidies, regulatory review of premium increases, and administrative waivers
that open up the exchanges to new populations. The ACA permits states to
142
but most
establish their own exchanges with minimal federal involvement,
states have opted not to do so, allowing HHS to step in and do it for them or in
partnership with them. 143 States that run their own exchanges enjoy broader
authority to reduce the impact of federal retrenchment on residents. In particular,
some states are using their authority over premium increases to undermine the
Trump Administration's efforts to cut federal subsidies.'
In the ACA's "three-legged stool" approach to increasing enrollment in the
direct-purchase market, the individual mandate and underwriting reforms were
138 See, e.g., Vann R. Newkirk 11, The FederalGovernment Abandons the Most Popular
Partofthe ACA, THE ATLANTIC (June 8, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive
/2018/06/aca-preexisting-conditions-doj/562442/ [https://perma.cc/4X5V-2383].
139
Underwriting restrictions in the group market are part of an older law--the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1994. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3(a)
(2012) (prohibiting group-market insurers from excluding based on preexisting conditions).
If the group-market underwriting regulations in HIPAA were repealed, state efforts to
replace them would be preempted by ERISA, at least with respect to plans offered by private,
non-church employers. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1)2) (2012).
140
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176J, § 5 (West 2014).
141 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1825 (West 2014).
14242 U.S.C. § 18031.
14 3

See State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2018,

KAISER FAM. FoUND.,

https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-health-insurance-marketplace-types
[https://perma.cc/X3HR-LPH4] (describing how fourteen states have state-based
marketplaces as of July 2014).
14 4
See Robert E. Moffit, States Are Offering Relieffrom Rising Health Care Costs.
2018),
(May 24,
Here 's How Congress Can Help, HERITAGE FOUND.
https://www.heritage.org/health-care-reform/commentary/states-are-offering-relief-risinghealth-care-costs-heres-how [https://perma.cc/G3PX-QEE5].

862

OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 79:4

supplemented by subsidies to reduce out-of-pocket costs. 14 5 The ACA's drafters
established two main subsidies: premium assistance tax credits (PTCs) and costsharing reduction payments (CSRs).1 46 First, PTCs reduce the price of directpurchase insurance for people with household incomes between 100% and
400% FPL who do not have access to public programs or affordable employerbased coverage.1 47 Plans sold on the exchanges are classified into four tiers
(platinum, gold, silver, and bronze) based on their actuarial value-a measure
of the financial protection afforded by a plan, determined by the combination of
its deductible, copayments, and coinsurance, calculated as the percentage of
covered costs that the plan pays for, on average.1 4 8 By statute, the amount of the
PTC subsidy is tied directly to the price of the second lowest-cost silver-tier plan
on the exchange and is calculated on a sliding scale based on income. 149 Second,
Section 1402 of the ACA requires insurers offering plans on the exchanges to
reduce deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance for people with household
incomes between 100% and 400% of FPL who purchase a plan from the silver
tier. 150 To offset the costs, the statute directs the HHS Secretary to make CSR
payments to insurers equal to the value of the reduction. 15 1 Unlike PTCs, which
are funded through an automatic appropriation, CSRs are subject to annual
appropriations through the budget process, making them vulnerable to shifts in
political control. 152 In 2017, the Trump Administration halted payments, which

14 5

Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform Is a "Three-Legged Stool:" The Costs of
Partially Repealing the Affordable Care Act, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 5, 2010),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/reports/2010/08/05/8226/health-carereform-is-a-three-legged-stool/ [https://perma.cc/EBC9-6SV2].
14626 U.S.C. § 36B(b) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 18071. In addition to subsidies, the ACA
included three key provisions aimed at redistributing funds from direct-purchase plans that
enroll low-risk populations to those that enroll high-risk populations: reinsurance, risk
corridors, and risk adjustment payments. 42 U.S.C §§ 18061-18063. The first two provisions
were intended to be temporary and expired in 2016. In 2018, the Trump Administration
halted risk adjustment payments (which were intended to be permanent) in response to a
lower court holding. See e.g., Dylan Scott, The Trump Administration Freeze on
Obamacare's Risk Adjustment Payments, Explained, Vox (July 9, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/7/9/17549812/trump-freeze-obamacarerisk-adjustment-payments [https://perma.cc/75HZ-6YGV].
14726 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 18081; id §18082.
14826 U.S.C. § 36B(b); see also KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WHAT THE ACTUARIAL
VALUES IN THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT MEAN 2 (Apr. 2011), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation
.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8177.pdf [https://perma.cc/FK5H-MRD5].
149 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d) (2012).
1 50 1d. § 18071(b)-(c).
15 1
1d § 18071(c)(3); id. § 18082(c)(3).
152
See Letter from Gen. Jeff Sessions Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice to Treasury
Sec'y Steven Mnuchin, Sec'y, U.S. Dept. of Treasury and Don Wright, Sec'y, U.S. Dept. of
Health and Human Services (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/csrpayment-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QEB-44UY].
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the Obama Administration had previously been making via a process that was
153
challenged by House Republicans in the courts.
In addition to facilitating the application of ACA subsidies to purchases on
their health insurance exchanges, states play an important role in reviewing
proposed premium increases for exchange plans. When CSR payments were
threatened, several states used this authority to minimize the impact on their
residents. 154 Because PTCs are automatically appropriated and tied to silverplan premiums, insurance regulators in several states worked with insurers to
load the additional expense of reducing cost sharing into the premiums of silver
plans. 155 This silver loading strategy meant that the federal government
continued to bear the costs and low-income residents continued to enjoy access
to coverage with reduced cost sharing. 15 6
A few states are exploring additional steps via administrative waiver that
would stabilize premiums on their exchanges and open up access to new
populations. Section 1332 of the ACA provides for state innovation waivers,
which may release states from certain statutory requirements as part of a
statewide plan that would, in the HHS Secretary's judgment, promote the
ACA's goals. 157 Ordinarily the PTCs and CSRs (were they to be reinstated) are
transmitted directly from the federal government to insurers. A 1332 waiver
1 58
Statutory criteria
may permit funds to pass through to the state instead.
require the state plan to provide coverage as comprehensive as that ensured by
the ACA to at least as many residents while avoiding any increase in federal
spending.1 59 As for Medicaid waivers, ACA waiver applications require the
state to enact authorizing legislation and provide opportunities for public
comment.

160

153 See generally U.S. House of Reps. v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 165 (D.D.C.
2016) (holding that the "ACA did not permanently appropriate money for reimbursements
to health insurers for reductions of deductibles, co-pays, and other means of cost-sharing").
154
See Moffit, supranote 144.
155 Allison K. Hoffman, Cost-Sharing Reductions, Technocrat Tinkering, and MarketBased Health Policy, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHics (forthcoming 2018).
156
See Margo Sanger-Katz & Kevin Quealy, When Silver Costs More Than Gold: How
Trump's Actions Have Scrambled Insurance Prices, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/upshot/when-silver-costs-more-than-gold-how[on file with Ohio State Law
trumps-actions-have-scrambled-insurance-prices.html
Journal].
157 42 U.S.C. § 18052(a)-(b) (2012); Heather Howard & Galen Benshoof, State
&

Innovation Waivers: Redrawing the Boundaries of the ACA, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y

L. 1203, 1204-05 (2015); Sarah Lueck & Jessica Schubel, Understanding The Affordable
Care Act's State Innovation ("1332") Waivers, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIEs 3-4

(Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2-5-15healthl.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TF83-YET7];John E. McDonough, Wyden's Waiver: State Innovation on
Steroids, 39 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1099, 1100-01 (2014).
15842 U.S.C. § 18052(a)(3) (2012).
1 59 Id § 18052(b)(1).
160 31 C.F.R. § 33.100 (a)(1) (2017).
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Several states have obtained or are pursuing 1332 waivers. 16 1 In 2017,
Alaska received a Section 1332 waiver to redirect PTC funds toward a state
reinsurance program that reimburses private insurers for claims paid to treat
enrollees with designated high-cost health conditions. 162 Prior to the 2016
election, California was pursuing a waiver to allow undocumented immigrants
to purchase unsubsidized insurance coverage on its exchange.1 63 In Oregon,
state officials are considering subsidizing private health insurance coverage for
all Oregon residents (including undocumented immigrants, excluding Medicare
enrollees) using a combination of state and federal funds.1 64 The proponents of
this strategy call it the Oregon Health Care Ingenuity Plan,1 65 but Obamacare
for All would be a more informative, if less popular, label.

E. Allowing Residents to Buy into a Public Option
Dissatisfaction with high out-of-pocket costs and subsidization of for-profit
insurers under the ACA has prompted some on the left to argue for expanding
access to direct-purchase insurance (while maintaining the fragmentary system)
by offering a public option.1 66 Although a public option was initially considered
as part of the ACA, it was ultimately stripped from the bill. 16 7 As the ACA came
16 1

See Tracking Section 1332 State Innovation Waivers, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (July 30,

2018), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/tracking-section-1332-state-innovation
-waivers/ [https://perma.cc/63S7-XETR]; Heather Howard, More States Looking to
Section 1332 Waivers, ST. HEALTH & VALUE STRATEGIES (July 30, 2018),
https://www.shvs.org/more-states-looking-to-section-1332-waivers/ [https://perma.cc/7AD
5-KTUW].
162
Letter from Bill Walker, Governor, Alaska, to Linda Rashid, Policy Advisor, CMS
(July 31, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/State-InnovationWaivers/Downloads/Alaska-STCs-signed-by-Treasury.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SHH-D28S];
&

Alaska: State Innovation Waiver under Section 1332 of the PPACA, CTR. FOR MEDICARE

MEDICAID SERVS. (July 11, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/
State-Innovation-Waivers/Downloads/Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/FTU2-NTYU].
163 Sen. Bill 10, 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016); see also Letter from Peter V. Lee,
Exec. Dir., Covered Cal., to Sylvia Burwell, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services
(Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Prograns-and-Initiatives/State-InnovationWaivers/Downloads/Covered-California-Section-1332-Waiver-Application- 12-16-16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TUF5-FDW8]; Letter from Peter V. Lee, Exec. Dir., Covered Cali., to
Kevin J. Counihan, Dir. Of Marketplace & Exec. Officer, HHS (Jan. 18,
2017), http://hbex.coveredca.com/stakeholders/Covered%20Califomia%201l332%20Waive
r/1332%20Application%20Withdrawal%2ORequest%2001 %201I8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A7KW-E3ZS]; Wendy E. Parmet et al., Immigration and Health: Law,
Policy, and Ethics, 45 (SuPP. 1) J.L. MED. & ETHICS 55, 56 (2017).
16 4

WHITE ET AL., supra note 92, at 12-14.
16 5 d.

166 Peter Sullivan, Dem Senators Unveil Expanded Public Optionfor
Health Insurance,
THE HILL (Apr. 18, 2018), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/383764-dem-senatorsunveil-expanded-public-option-for-health-insurance [https://perna.cc/EU48-C3XH].
16 7
Mariah McGill & Gillian MacNaughton, The Struggle to Achieve the Human Right
to Health Care in the United States, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 625, 659 (2016) ("[T]he
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under threat, Democratic lawmakers again turned to the possibility of a public
option, centered around opening up access to Medicare, sometimes referred to
as Medicare buy-in or (confusingly) Medicare for all.1 6 8 At the state level,
legislators (barring a veto by the governor) could offer their Medicaid plans
(currently financed by a mix of state and federal funds), non-Medicaid public
plans (currently financed by state funds), or state employee benefit plans
(currently financed by state funds and premiums) for purchase on the
exchange. 169 They could limit access to residents who are eligible to purchase
insurance on the exchange under federal law or they could open up the buy-in
to other groups, such as undocumented immigrants or people who have access
to employer-based coverage that qualifies as affordable under the ACA. 17 0 Most
state-level public option proposals would involve leveraging Medicaid in some
way-by using the state's Medicaid provider network, reimbursement rates, or
public option-a government run plan that people could choose instead of private plans on
the exchange-was supported by 77 percent of the population but was ultimately stripped
from the [ACA] bill.") (citing Jordan Fabian, Pelosi: Public Option Will Not Be in Health
Bill Despite Liberal Efforts to Revive It, The HILL
(Mar.
12,
2010),
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/86447-pelosi-public-option-will-not-bein-health-bill [https://perma.cc/TMJ7-EPEG]).
168 Dylan Scott, The "PleasantAmbiguity" ofMedicare-for-A I in 2018, Explained, Vox
(July 2, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/7/2/17468448/medicare
-for-all-single-payer-health-care-2018-elections [https://perma.cc/99LQ-BZSZ]; see also
Medicare-X Choice Act of 2017, S. 1970, 115th Cong. (2017).
16 9

PATRICIA BOOZANG ET AL., MANATT HEALTH, MEDICAID BUY-IN: STATE OPTIONS,
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS, AND SECTION 1332 WAIVER IMPLICATIONS I (May 2018),

https://www.shvs.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/MedicaidBuyin_-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6URB-KGHV]. Several states already have limited buy-in programs in
place for certain children with special needs, but that coverage acts primarily as a supplement
to private insurance, covering services that private insurers typically do not. Medicaid BuyIns, CTR. FOR ADVANCING HEALTH POL'Y & PRACTICE, http://cahpp.org/project/the-catalyst-

center/financing-strategy/medicaid-buy-ins/ [https://perma.cc/YTR3-XV82]. Section 1331
of the ACA gives states the option of seeking the HI-IHS Secretary's approval to implement a
state-contracted basic health plan (BHP) to cover residents with household incomes up to
200% FPL. 42 U.S.C. § 18051 (2012). New York and Minnesota have taken advantage of
this option, which exists outside of Medicaid and the exchanges, and additional states are
considering doing so. Jennifer Tolbert et al., Improving the Affordability of Coverage
Through the Basic HealthProgramin Minnesota and New York, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec.

2016), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/improving-the-affordability-ofcoverage-through-the-basic-health-program-in-minnesota-and-new-york/
[https://perma.cc/WDM6-SN75]; see, e.g., S. Memorial 3, 53rd Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2018).
170
The Nevada bill directed the state director of health and human services to establish
a plan "within Medicaid" and make it available "to any person who is not otherwise eligible
for Medicaid." Assemb. B. 374, 2017 Leg., 79th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2017). Similar bills
introduced in Wisconsin and Minnesota have defined the population to be offered the buyin option differently. BadgerCare Plus offers assistance for childless adults as well as
demonstration project purchase options, Assemb. B. 449, 103d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2017).
MinnesotaCare offers a separate purchase option for individuals exceeding the
MinnesotaCare income eligibility limit; federal waiver authorization. S. File 58, 90th Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2017)
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claims administration infrastructure, or offering benefits modeled after the
state's Medicaid plan.171 What this would look like on the ground depends on
the extent to which a state's existing Medicaid program has been privatized. The
functions involved in plan administration-such as overseeing provider
networks, negotiating reimbursement formulas, administering claims, and
designing benefit packages-could be performed by a state agency, private
contractors, or a combination of the two.
Typically, progressive states like Vermont 72 and Oregon,1 73 where the
legislature and executive are both Democrat-controlled, are discussing
Medicaid buy-in proposals. States with Democratic legislatures and Republican
executives, such as New Mexicol 74 and Nevada, 7 5 are also exploring the idea.
In 2017, Nevada's legislature voted to allow any of the state's residents to
purchase Medicaid at a price considerably lower than private insurance
premiums on the state's exchange.1 76 Those who qualify for federal subsidies
for the purchase of private insurance on the exchange could use those subsidies
to purchase Medicaid coverage instead.17 7 The bill's sponsor specifically noted
that the proposal was a reaction to the "mixed messages coming from our current
federal administration."1 78 In addition to undermining the viability of the ACA
exchanges, there were threats from the federal government to terminate the
Medicaid expansion, which Nevada had adopted.1 79 The buy-in proposal might
have allowed residents living between 100% and 138% of FPL to keep their
Medicaid coverage by switching from combined federal-state financing under
the Medicaid statute to coverage subsidized by ACA tax credits.18 0 Ultimately,
however, the bill was vetoed by the state's Republican governor, amid
opposition from hospitals and other groups.' 8
Some proponents support giving residents the option of purchasing publicly
administered health coverage as an end in itself. A public option could make
coverage more affordable for people who are not eligible for ACA subsidies.
Competition from a public plan offering lower deductibles and copays for
enrollees at lower administrative costs could prompt private insurers to compete
171 BOOZANG ET AL., supra note 169, at 1-6.
1 7 2 HsIAO ET AL., supra note 8, at xii.
1 7 3 WHIrE ET AL., supra note 92, at 14-16.

1 74 N.M. S. Memorial 3.
1 75 Nev. Assemb. B. 374.
176
Alison Kodjak, Nevada May Become FirstState to Offer Medicaid to All, Regardless
ofIncome, NPR (June 13, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/06/13/5
32783189/nevada-may-become-first-state-to-offer-medicaid-to-all-regardless-of-income
[https://perma.cc/C6TY-JNBD].
177Id
178Id

1 79 Id
1 80 Nev. Assemb. B. 374.
181 David Montero, Nevada Governor Vetoes Medicaid-for-All Bill, L.A. TIMES (June
17, 2017), http://www.1atimes.com/nation/la-na-nevada-medicaid-2017-story.html
[https://perma.cc/5QBZ-B9FK].
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by becoming more efficient and improving the financial protection offered by
their coverage.1 82 Aside from promoting competition on the exchanges, a public
option could give consumers more options in counties where only one private
insurer participates in the exchange.1 83 Other public option proponents openly
184
argue that it is a means to the end of single-payer health care, a topic I will
turn to in the next section. These goals may not be easy to harmonize. For
example, if the public option is more affordable than private coverage, the result
could be less competition, not more. Indeed, that may be the result envisioned
by proponents who see the public option as a glide path to single-payer health
care. 185
The drafters of public option bills have assumed that one or more
administrative waivers could be necessary. 186 A Medicaid Section 1115 waiver
could be required for any public option that would affect a state's Medicaid plan.
An ACA Section 1332 waiver could be required to allow those who are eligible
for premium assistance tax credits to apply them toward the purchase of the
public option. Whether a state could offer a public option for sale on its
exchange in the absence of permission from IIS or facilitating legislation from
Congress is a critical question worth exploring in detail.
1. Complying with FederalMedicaidLaw
Whether a Medicaid Section 1115 waiver would be required depends on
how the state designs its public option. There are two issues: (1) ensuring that
182
8

See MANATT HEALTH, supra note 169, at 2.
1 3 Id
184 Id.
185 Id.

186 See, e.g., Assemb. B. 374, 2017 Leg., 79th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2017) (directing the state
health and human services director to "apply to the Secretary of the United States Department
of Health and Human Services for any necessary waiver pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1315 or
§ 18052, as applicable"); Assemb. B. 449, 103rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2017) (directing the
state department of health services "if required, [to] request a waiver from or submit
amendments to the state Medical Assistance plan to the secretary of the federal department
of health and human services to establish a program that allows individuals with income
[above the eligibility threshold for Medicaid under federal law and the state's existing
waiver] the option of purchasing coverage [currently available to Medicaid enrollees] instead
of purchasing an individual health plan through private insurance"); S. File 58, 90th Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2017) (directing "the commissioner of human services [to] seek
necessary federal waiver authority to establish a program that allows individuals with income
above the maximum income eligibility limit [for Medicaid under federal law and the state's
existing waiver], the option of purchasing coverage through MinnesotaCare instead of
purchasing a qualified health plan [on the state's exchange] or an individual health plan
offered outside of [the state exchange]"; to "seek necessary federal waiver authority .. . for
individuals ... to use advanced tax credits and cost-sharing credits, if eligible, to purchase
this option" and to "seek necessary federal waiver authority to permit the MinnesotaCare
purchase option to be offered through [the state exchange] as a coverage option and to be
compared with qualified health plans offered through [the state exchange]").
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the coverage provided to federally eligible enrollees comports with federal
requirements and (2) ensuring that federal Medicaid funds are not used to crosssubsidize buy-in enrollees.
First, in the absence of an 1115 waiver, the state would certainly have to
ensure that federally eligible enrollees continue to be covered for services
mandated by federal law. State lawmakers have attempted to address this issue
in broad strokes. For example, Nevada's public option bill specified that
federally eligible Medicaid enrollees would continue to receive the benefits to
which they are entitled under federal law, while buy-in enrollees would receive
the same benefits, with the exception of coverage for non-emergency medical
transportation.1 8 7 There are almost certainly other Medicaid benefits that
Nevada policymakers would eventually have denied to buy-in enrollees, even
though some federally eligible enrollees are entitled to them-such as long-term
care coverage, adult dental and vision, and social worker coordination services.
Second, the state would have to ensure that buy-in enrollees are in a separate
risk pool from federally-eligible Medicaid enrollees, to prevent cross-subsidy.
Combining the two groups into a single risk pool would certainly require an
1115 waiver. As the Nevada bill's findings note, the Medicaid statute prohibits
the use of federal Medicaid funds to finance expenses that are not authorized by
statute or waiver. 188 Cross-subsidy is the entire point of risk pooling, the process
whereby revenues are pooled together before being transferred to the entity (in
this case a state agency) that will purchase coverage (from private companies)
or individual services (from health care providers) for enrollees. By combining
the funds, pooling spreads the financial risk across all individuals in a pool. If,
for example, a state agency uses a combination of state taxes, premiums paid by
public option enrollees, and federal grants intended to cover federally-eligible
Medicaid enrollees to purchase coverage from a private managed care
organization, the risk that the managed care organization bears will be spread
across all enrollees. If a public option purchaser experiences a catastrophic event
requiring expensive care, the funds to provide that care will be drawn from a
pool that includes funds intended for federally eligible enrollees. The possibility
that public-option purchasers may be sicker, on average, than federally eligible
enrollees has prompted some advocates for low-income enrollees to view public
option proposals with a wary eye.1 89
States could conform to the letter of the law without the need for a waiver
if they maintain segregation between state-only funds for buy-in enrollees
(partially financed by premium payments) and mixed state and federal funds for
federally eligible enrollees. Segregation of funds and prevention of cross187
188

Assemb. B. 374, 2017 Leg., 79th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2017).
1d. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(25)(G)); id § 1396b(a)(7); 42 C.F.R. § 433.15(b)
(2016)).
1 89
Jennifer Lay & Hdctor Hemindez-Delgado, State Medicaid Buy-Ins: Implications
for Low-Income Enrollees, NAT'L HEALTH L. PROGRAM 2 & 12 n.5 (Feb. 14, 2018),
http://www.healthlaw.org/issues/medicaid/state-medicaid-buy-ins-implications-for-lowincome-people [https://perma.cc/MN8M-S2ZT].
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subsidy would be challenging, but not unprecedented. Several states maintain
separate funds to cover abortions for Medicaid enrollees that cannot be financed
using federal funds due to the Hyde Amendment. 19 0 Many states have adopted
a similar approach to segregating payments for abortions covered by plans
subsidized by federal funds on the exchanges.1 91
A state seeking an 1115 waiver to circumvent these requirements could
easily characterize a public option plan as experimental, given how little is
known about the effects of a public option on a state's health care system.
Whether it would be "likely to assist in promoting the objectives of [the
Medicaid Act]"1 92 is another matter. Arguably, post-ACA, the objectives of the
Medicaid Act include using the Medicaid program as one component of a
universal coverage strategy. Others would argue, however, that Medicaid is
intended to serve people living in low-income households and provide a buy-in
option, which could be exercised by higher-income households, would not serve
this purpose. An amenable administration could probably grant such a waiver
and survive a legal challenge by traditional Medicaid advocates.
Ultimately, however, the most logical approach to providing a public option
in the majority of states would probably not require a waiver. Although public
option proposals are described as allowing non-federally eligible residents to
buy into the state's Medicaid plan, in the majority of states, there is no single
Medicaid plan for residents to buy into. Many states no longer have a single
Medicaid benefits package, provider network, reimbursement formula, or
claims administration infrastructure for the public option to build on. In states
where Medicaid enrollees are already scattered across multiple private and
public plans governed by a mix of traditional Medicaid and benchmark
standards, placing federally-eligible and buy-in enrollees in a single risk pool
and giving them identical benefits would not be feasible even if a waiver were
available. In states that have largely privatized Medicaid, the most natural
approach would be to develop a public option that relies on the state's
infrastructure for Medicaid managed care contracts, but is otherwise separate
from Medicaid. The differences between a public option and a standard directpurchase exchange plan in states that have largely privatized Medicaid would
probably be minimal. For the plans currently sold on the exchange, the resident
purchases coverage from a private insurer subject to state oversight, with or
without the help of subsidies paid by the federal government to the insurer. A
privatized public option would involve a state contract with a private insurer:
for a capitated payment, the insurer would perform some or all of the functions
19 0

1d.; Alina Salganicoff et al., The Hyde Amendment and Coverage for Abortion
Services, KAISER FAM. FoUND. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.kff.org/womens-healthpolicy/perspective/the-hyde-amendment-and-coverage-for-abortion-services/
[https://perma.cc/5 SS4-PJY5].
191 Magda Schaler-Haynes et al., Abortion Coverage and Health Reform: Restrictions
and Optionsfor Exchange-BasedInsurance Markets, 15 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 323,

381 (2012).
19242 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2012).
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involved in plan design and administration. The resident would pay a specified
premium to the state to buy into coverage, but the coverage would otherwise be
indistinguishable from private insurance. In this scenario, the impact on
Medicaid could be negligible and a waiver may be unnecessary.

2. Applying ACA Premium Assistance Tax Credits Toward the Purchase
of a Public Option

&

Regardless of their impact on Medicaid, state buy-in plans could also
require an ACA Section 1332 waiver, given that many residents who might
purchase public coverage would be eligible for premium assistance tax credits
and would be unable to afford the public option without them.
Under ACA Section 1401, PTCs can only be used to purchase a qualified
health plan (QHP) on an exchange. This provision could be waived by HHS
pursuant to Section 1332.193 Alternatively, a state could attempt to design its
public option plan to satisfy the statutory requirements for QHPs set forth in
Section 1301, obviating the need for a waiver. Jennifer Lay and H6ctor
Hemndez-Delgado, writing for the National Health Law Program, state rather
conclusively that "Medicaid, by definition, is not a QHP" and thus buy-in public
option plans would require a 1332 waiver. 194 A report for the State Health
Value Strategies initiative, authored by Patricia Boozang, Chiquita BrooksLaSure, and Ashley Traube of Manatt Health reached a contrary conclusion,
determining that "[i]t is possible to structure the state-sponsored product buy-in
option without the need for 1332 waiver authority, which states might want to
seriously consider given the administrative burden of applying for a 1332 waiver
and the uncertainty of approval." 95 Given how crucial PTCs would be to the
success of a state-level public option, how many states are interested in pursuing
a public option, and how unlikely the current administration is to grant a 1332
waiver to allow it, the question merits further consideration.
ACA Section 1301 sets forth the requirements for QHPs, specifying that
they must (1) be approved by the exchange, (2) offer the essential health benefit
(EHB) package set forth in Section 1302(a), and (3) be offered by a health
insurance issuer that is (4) "licensed and in good standing to offer health
insurance coverage in [the state in which it offers coverage on the
exchange]. "196 Additionally, the health insurance issuer must (5) agree "to offer
at least one qualified health plan in the silver level and at least one plan in the
gold level" on the exchange, (6) refrain from setting differential premiums
depending on whether the plan is offered on the exchange or "offered directly
from the issuer or through an agent," and (7) comply with HHS regulations
193

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1332, 124 Stat.
120 194
(2010).
Lav & Hemndez-Delgado, supra note 189, at 12 n.5.
19 5
See BOOZANG ET AL.,, supra note 169, at 3.

196 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1301, 124 Stat.
120 (2010).
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promulgated under Section 1311(d) and any other requirements established by
the exchange.1 9 7
The first requirement is easily dispensed with in states that run their own
exchanges. State-run exchanges have flexibility to approve a state Medicaid
plan as a QUP, assuming that the other six requirements can be satisfied. With
respect to the second requirement, Lay and Hern~mdez-Delgado draw a
distinction between exchange plans, which must offer coverage that satisfies the
ACA's EHB requirements, and Medicaid plans, which must offer coverage
specified in the Medicaid statute. 198 But that distinction belies the flexibility
states have to enroll many Medicaid recipients in alternative benefit plans. As
described above, the ACA imposed the same baseline requirements on Medicaid
alternative benefit plans as QHPs sold on the exchange: the EHB package.19
Medicaid plans typically offer more comprehensive coverage than QuPs, not
less. 20 0 Moreover, pursuant to a 2012 HHS regulation, states have flexibility to
define the EHB package by selecting a benchmark plan from among specified
options,20 1 giving them considerable authority to align their public option plan
with the EBB requirements.
Would a Medicaid buy-in plan be "offered by a health insurance issuer"?
And could it be "licensed" by the state? Whether the remaining requirements of
Section 1301 are met could turn on the meaning of the term "offered." In most
states, most Medicaid enrollees are covered by private health insurance
companies that contract with the state. 202 Is a privately administered Medicaid
managed care plan "offered" by the private insurance company even when it is
operated pursuant to a contract with the state? Or is such a plan "offered" by the
state exclusively? What about Vermont's Medicaid managed care plan, which
is fully state run? Is Vermont's publicly administered managed care plan a
"health insurance issuer" if it is purchased by enrollees who pay premiums on
the exchange? With respect to the fifth requirement of Section 1301, one
solution would be for the state to contract with a private insurer that also offers
gold and silver plans on the exchange. Another option would be to develop two
public option plans - one with gold-level cost sharing at a lower premium and
the other with silver-level cost sharing at a higher premium. Regarding the sixth
requirement, there is an open question as to whether the state would be permitted
to offer a no-premium Medicaid plan to federally eligible enrollees (as required

197 42 U.S.C. § 18021 (2012).
198
Lav & Hemindez-Delgado, supra note 194, at 2-3.
199 See infra text accompanying note 74.
200 David Lipschutz et al., Comparison of Consumer Protections in Three Health
Insurance Markets: Medicare Advantage, Qualified Health Plans and MedicaidManaged
Care Organizations, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.kff.org/reportsection/comparison-of-consumer-protections-in-three-health-insurance-marketscomparison-of-specific-areas-of-consumer-protections/ [https://perma.cc/LR8A-2G3V].
0145 C.F.R. § 156.100 (2018).
202
Lipschutz et al., supra note 200.
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under the Medicaid statute absent a waiver) while offering a buy-in Medicaid
plan for sale on the exchange.
These questions are unsettled. If a state does adopt a Medicaid buy-in plan
without obtaining waivers from HHS, it could face a legal challenge. Even if the
state carefully tailored its public option plan to comply with federal Medicaid
law and the ACA's requirements in the absence of waivers, the prospect of
expensive litigation may be enough to chill progressive enthusiasm.
To address these uncertainties, progressive Democrats, including many seen
as likely contenders for the 2020 presidential nomination, have introduced
federal legislation to facilitate Medicaid buy-in plans at the state level. 203 At
least one conservative Republican countered with a proposal to prohibit states
from using federal funds to support single-payer health care. 204 The growing
politicization of the public option strategy could make state lawmakers reluctant
to proceed. On the other hand, progressive Democrats in some states may find
there are gains to be made in publicly taking a stand in favor of more radical
health reform strategies, even as advocates remain uncertain as to the precise
shape such strategies may take.
IV.

GOING FURTHER: STATE-LEVEL SINGLE-PAYER HEALTH CARE

This Article argues that states can and should honor international legal
norms regarding the right to health by adopting single-payer health care
financing at the state level. Under a single-payer system, health care coverage
for a defined bundle of essential health benefits would be publicly financed. 2 05
The health care delivery system - made up of hospitals, physician groups, longterm care providers, etc. - would retain the mix of mostly private providers and
some publicly administered hospitals that we have today. Consumers would
probably remain free to purchase supplemental coverage from private insurers,
although in some cases, other countries have prohibited private insurance
coverage that directly competes with the single-payer plan by covering the same
bundle of benefits. 206
Globally, several countries provide publicly financed, privately delivered
universal health care. In some, the system is financed and operates entirely at
the national level. Many of the most prominent examples, however, are financed
203 State Public Option Act, S. 2001, 115th Cong. (2017).
204

See Mallory Shelbourne, GOP Senator Eyes Ban on States' Single
Payer Systems,

THE HILL (Sept. 19, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/351344-gop-senator-eyesban-on-states-single-payer-systems [https://perma.cc/9QUN-EBLK] (quoting Republican
Senator John Kennedy of Louisiana regarding his proposal to amend the Graham-Cassidy
reform bill to add a provision prohibiting states from using federal funds to support singlepayer health care).

205 Jonathan Oberlander, The Virtues and Vices of Single-PayerHealthcare,374 NEW

ENG. J. MED. 1401, 1401 (2016).
206 In Canada, the Supreme Court struck down a prohibition on private insurance.
Chaoulli v. Attorney Gen. of Que., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 805, 810 (Can.).
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and administered jointly by the national government
governments (such as states, provinces, or districts).

2 07

and subsidiary

Single-payer systems are

typically financed through payroll taxes, income taxes, an earmarked health care
tax, or a combination of the three. 2 08 These taxes are typically progressive, with
the tax rate rising at higher incomes.2 09 Thus, shifting from our current system
(in which the majority of individuals are covered by employer-based insurance
subsidized through tax exemptions that disproportionately benefit higherincome households) to a single-payer system financed primarily through
progressive taxes would redistribute the burden of paying for health care
coverage from lower- to higher-income households.
Single-payer health care financing was never seriously considered in the
debates that culminated in the ACA. 210 Following the 2016 election, in which
Senator Bernie Sanders expressed strong support for Medicare for All, the idea
gained traction among Democratic legislators and contenders for the 2020
presidential nomination. 2 11 It still faces many political obstacles, 2 12 however,
and lawmakers are often vague on the details of how it would work. 2 13
Concerns about the percentage of the population that remains uninsured,
high premiums and out-of-pocket costs for those who are insured, and the
disparate impact of these gaps on people of color have prompted policymakers
in several states to consider single-payer health care financing. 2 14 In 2011,
Vermont's legislature passed and Governor Peter Shumlin signed legislation to

207

See generally Jacalyn Duffin, The Impact ofSingle-PayerHealth Care on Physician
Income in Canada, 1850-2005, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1198 (2011) (describing the
Canadian health care system's inception in Saskatchewan and its gradual expansion over the
latter twentieth century).
208 See generally Jost, supranote 8 (discussing the financing of single-payer health care
systems outside the United States).
209 Id
2 10

See McGill & MacNaughton, supra note 167, at 659 ("[A]lthough a CBS poll taken
in 2009, around the time the PPACA was drafted, showed 59 percent of U.S. residents
supported government sponsored health insurance, the architects of health care reform never
considered a single-payer health care system to be a viable option.").
211 MedicareforAll, FRIENDS OF BERNIE SANDERS, https://berniesanders.com/medicare
forall/ [https://perma.cc/XD94-MM9J]); Ed Clendaniel, How Medicarefor All Could Sway
Voters in 2020, MERCURY NEWS (July 21, 2018), https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/07/
21/editorial-medicare-for-all/ [https://perma.cc/M8HE-M8PW].
2 12
Oberlander, supra note 205, at 1402-03 ("Medicare for All, which aims to constrain
health care spending, faces intense opposition from insurers, the medical care industry, and
much of organized medicine.. . . Although Americans would save money by not paying
premiums to private insurers, the politics of moving immense levels of health care spending
visibly into the federal budget are daunting, given the prevailing antitax sentiment . . .. Then
there are the familiar institutional barriers to major reform within U.S. government, including
the necessity of securing a supermajority of 60 votes in the Senate to overcome a filibuster.
In short, single payer has no realistic path to enactment in the foreseeable future.").
2 13
See Scott, supranote 168.
214 See, e.g., WHITE ET AL., supra note 92, at ix.
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implement a single-payer system over a six-year period. 2 15 The implementation
plan would have involved maximizing Medicaid eligibility under federal law 2 16
and then seeking waivers that would allow the state to redirect federal Medicaid
and ACA funding toward the new state single-payer program. 2 17 Proponents
initially hoped that a significant state tax hike would not be necessary. 2 18 But
by 2014, it became clear that the state would have to adopt a new income tax of
around 9.5% and an 11.5% payroll tax on employers. 2 19 The payroll tax and
other strategies for bringing people previously covered by employer-based
health plans into the state single-payer plan triggered concerns about ERISA
preemption. Thus, Vermont determined that it would also have to navigate all
of the legal obstacles applicable to the strategies discussed in Parts I and H:
ERISA preemption, Medicaid Section 1115 waivers, and ACA Section 1332
waivers. In 2014, Shumlin reversed his position and terminated implementation,
citing "limitations of state-based financing-limitations of federal law,
limitations of our tax capacity, and sensitivity of our economy." 2 20
Health policy wonks often point to the shadow that failed health reform
efforts can cast-rendering politicians reluctant to return to the issue after a
bruising fight. In spite of Vermont's failure, however, lawmakers in Vermont
and other states continue to explore single-payer proposals. In 2017, California
legislators introduced similar single payer legislation to cover all Californians,
including about two million undocumented immigrants. 22 1 The bill passed out
of committee but was shelved by the California Speaker of the Assembly
Anthony Rendon on the grounds that it failed to address financing and cost
controls.222 One report cited the need for a 15% payroll tax increase to fund the
single payer system, even assuming California would receive HHS approval to
divert all federal funds from Medicaid and private exchange subsidies toward

215 William C. Hsiao et al., What Other States Can Learn from Vermont's Bold
Experiment; Embracinga Single-Payer Health Care Financing System, 30 HEALTH AFF.
1232, 1232 (2011).
216 The initial financing plan was to increase the state's Medicaid spending by 3% each
year to maximize optional federal expansions. See John E. McDonough, The Demise of
Vermont's Single-PayerPlan, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1584 (2015).
217 Id
218 [d
219Id
220 STATE OF VERMONT, GREEN MOUNTAIN CARE: A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL
FOR
BUILDING VERMONT'S UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (2014) http://hcr.vermont.gov/

sites/hcr/files/pdfs/GMC%20FINAL%20REPORT/20123014.pdf[https://permacc/KS2T3Y3D] [hereinafter GMC 2014 REPORT].
221 Healthy California Act, S.B. 562, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
222 Katy Murphy & Tracy Seipel, Single-Payer Health Care Put on Hold in California
as Leader Calls Bill "Woefully Incomplete," MERCURY NEWS (June 24, 2017),
https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/06/23/breaking-single-payer-health-care-put-on-holdin-california-as-leader-calls-legislation-woefully-incomplete/ [https://perma.cc/6LQTN4ED].
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the single payer system.2 23 A similar proposal has repeatedly passed the New
York Assembly - in 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 - but New York has a
224
bicameral legislature and the senate has refused to put the measure to a vote.
22 5
Many commentators see
Oregon's legislature is exploring a similar proposal.
the 2018 elections as a key test of support for candidates who support Medicarefor-All and Medicaid-for-All proposals, 226 even as Democratic party leadership
warned candidates that specifically referring to "single-payer" plans was fraught
with political risk.2 27
To say that a state-level single-payer system is more politically feasible than
a federal single-payer system is not to say that a state-level plan is in any way
easy or likely. The political environment may be more favorable for singlepayer proposals at the state level, but state governments seeking to adopt a
single-payer plan face particular legal hurdles not applicable to the federal
government. Unlike the federal legislature, nearly all state legislatures operate
under some form of balanced budget requirement, at least with respect to the
state's general fund. 22 8 Federal income taxes crowd out state and local taxes, a
constraint that is exacerbated by 2018 legislation that eliminates the state
income tax deduction. 229 As noted above, the contours of ERISA preemption of
2 30
While statutory waivers
state-level health reform remain deeply uncertain.
provide avenues for states to repurpose federal funds to support a state-level
single-payer plan, the HHS Secretary is given considerable discretion to deny
231
The
state waiver applications, even where statutory criteria are met.
officials
federal
and
state
between
negotiations
on
waivers
of
dependence
223

See Angela Hart, Raise Taxes or Ration Health Care? Why Single-Payer Won't Work
in California. Yet, SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.sacbee.com/news/
[https://perma.cc/34RM-JEQF].
politics-govemment/capitol-alert/article201541734.html
224
Assemb. B. A04738, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
22 5

See WHITE ET AL., supra note 92, at 1.

226Dylan Scott, Single-Payer's Big Test: Can Medicare-for-All Win in Competitive
House Districts?,VOx (June 1, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/6/1/
17378840/califomia-democratic-primary-2018-medicare-for-all [https://perma.cc/FB2YASTT].
2 27
Jennifer Haberkorn, The Two Words You Can't Say in a DemocraticAd, POLITICO
(June 8, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/08/democratic-single-payer-healthcare-ads-609066 [https://perma.cc/22NF-42JZ].
2 28

See generally NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE

BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS (Oct. 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/State
BalancedBudgetProvisions20l0.pdf [https://perma.cc/MM79-NU4C] (surveying state
balanced budget requirements).
229
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 680 n.13 (2012) (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting); Andrea Louise Campbell, The Republican Tax
Bill Will Make It Harderfor States and Cities to Pay Their Bills, WASH. POST (Dec. 21,

2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/12/21/the-republican
-tax-bill-will-make-it-harder-for-states-and-cities-to-pay-their-bills/ [https://perma.cc/8LF
6-2S9F].
230
Bagley, supra note 118, at 15.
23142 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2012).
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influenced by the shifting winds of political change and the possibility of legal
challenges from industry groups with a great deal of money at stake inject
considerable uncertainty into state policymaking. In spite of these obstacles, a
state-level single-payer playbook is beginning to take shape. It would require
states to maximize federal funds under existing programs, repurpose those funds
to finance single-payer coverage, and develop new state revenue streams while
avoiding ERISA preemption.

A. RepurposingExisting FederalFunds to Finance a State-Level
Single-PayerPlan
The starting point for single-payer financing at the state level is to repurpose
state and federal funds already committed to covering the state's residents.
Redirecting existing state funds to a single-payer system is relatively simple, but
federal health care funds come with restrictions. At first blush, it may seem that
Republican proposals to block grant existing federal assistance would be a boon
to states seeking additional flexibility to create a single payer system. The
flexibility of a block grant would indeed be helpful, but current proposals are
aimed at cutting federal health spending over time, without adopting any
strategies to cut overall health care costs. 232 Their primary goal is to shift costs
from the federal government to the states, hospitals, and families, not to give
states flexibility to achieve universal coverage with full federal support. 233 In
the absence of a block grant that keeps pace with health care costs, states must
exploit flexibilities within existing health care programs.
Nationwide in 2016, 45% of health care expenditures were paid for by
governments at the federal, state, and local levels. 23 4 Medicare accounts for 20%
of all U.S. health care spending; Medicaid accounts for 17%.235 The remaining
public funds go to the Children's Health Insurance Program ACA subsidies, and
premium contributions to cover public employees. 2 36 Government health care
spending per person in the United States is comparable to per-capita spending
from all sources in Canada, the United Kingdom, and many other countries.2 37
232

See Block Grants: A Bad Idea for Medicaid, FAMILIES USA (Apr. 2016),
http://familiesusa.org/sites/default/files/productdocuments/MCDBlockGrantFactsheet.
pdf [https://perma.cc/3JQ9-CRVM].
233 Id
234

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERvs., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES
2016

HIGHLIGHTS 3 (2016), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/
Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/highlights.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3VD7-H887] [hereinafter CMS HIGHLIGHTS].
23 5 d
236 CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE 2018 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK
17 (June 2018),

https://www.cbo.gov/system/files?file=2018-06/53919-20181tbo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D65S-4UU5].
237
At 45% of all health care expenditures in the United States, government expenditures
amount to $4,656 per person. Id. This is comparable to per capita expenditures from all
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But health care prices-the fees paid to physicians, hospitals, and
238
And even if
pharmaceutical companies-are far higher here than elsewhere.
existing public expenditures were sufficient to provide universal health care
access for all residents, lawmakers seeking to redirect funds to a single
government social insurance program face political obstacles at the federal level
and legal obstacles at the state level. These legal obstacles can be overcome by
states with careful planning and the approval of a sympathetic presidential
Administration.

1. Complying with FederalMedicaidLaw
To ensure that federally eligible Medicaid enrollees receive the benefits to
which they are entitled under federal law, a state single-payer plan must either
(1) provide the most generous coverage mandated by federal law for any group
of enrollees to all enrollees or (2) provide distinct benefit packages to various
populations depending on their status under federal law. As described above,
however, Medicaid benefit packages may vary from plan to plan within a state,
depending on enrollees' status under federal and state law, various waivers a
state might have already obtained, the specific terms negotiated between the
state Medicaid agency and private companies, and various matters left to the
239
The Medicaid benefit
discretion of public and private decision-makers.
packages to which at least some enrollees are entitled under federal law extend
2 40
Other benefit packages
well beyond what private insurance typically covers.
provided by states to Medicaid enrollees are indistinguishable from the private
insurance plans sold on the state's exchange. 24 1 Realistically, single-payer plan
cannot-and probably should not-adopt a uniform approach to benefits for all
enrollees.
Existing state single-payer proposals have generally specified that all
residents who enroll in the plan will, for the most part, be entitled to the coverage
currently offered to Medicaid enrollees, while continuing to distinguish among
groups of residents by offering certain benefits only to federally-eligible
enrollees. Under Oregon's single-payer proposal, for example, all residents
sources in Canada ($4,752) and the United Kingdom ($4,192); see Sawyer & Cox, supra
note 1.
238 See, e.g., Sarah Kliff & Soo Oh, America's Health Care PricesAre Out of Control.
These 11 Charts Prove It., Vox (May 10, 2018), https://www.vox.com/a/health-prices
[https://perma.cc/8R8L-DSCD] (analyzing data from the International Federation of Health
Plans 2016 Report).
239

See supra Part 11.

240 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b) (2012); see also Hannah Katch, Medicaid Works: Millions
Beneft from Medicaid's Effective, Efficient Coverage, Ctr. Budget & Pol'y Priorities (June
2, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/research/health/medicaid-works-millions-benefit-frommedicaids-effective-efficient-coverage [https://perma.cc/CEJ5-CMRW].
241 See What the Actuarial Values in the Affordable Care Act Mean, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Apr. 2011), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8177.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FK5H-MRD5]; Katch, supra note 240.
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under age 21 would be covered for early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and
treatment services, regardless of their status under federal law, but other benefits
would be limited to federally eligible enrollees. 242 Vermont's single-payer plan
would have been facilitated by the fact that the state does not rely on private
coverage for any of its Medicaid enrollees. Green Mountain Care, the state's
publicly administered Medicaid managed care plan, would have been opened up
to all residents. 243 Those who are federally eligible for Medicaid coverage
would have continued to receive coverage mandated by federal law, 244 while
other enrollees could receive more limited benefits. 24 5
Even if a state's single-payer plan carefully ensures that all enrollees receive
at least the minimum benefits to which they are entitled under federal law, it
would still require an 1115 waiver if federal Medicaid funds are in any way
mingled with funds used to cover people who are not eligible for Medicaid.2 46
Separation of risk pools and segregation of funds would be difficult, but not
impossible, as described above in the section on public option plans, but
segregated risk pools could undermine some of the purposes that a single-payer
plan might serve, as discussed in Part IV, below.
A state single-payer waiver application would have to satisfy all of the
requirements for Section 1115 discussed in Part I. Like public-option plans, a
single-payer plan would trigger debate regarding its relation to the purpose of
the Medicaid Act. Additionally, negotiations between the state and HHS over
the appropriate baseline for judging budget neutrality would be crucial. Perhaps
most troubling, a Section 1115 waiver could require periodic reauthorization, 247
putting a state's entire single-payer system at the mercy of not just one
presidential administration, but potentially many.
2. Complying with the ACA
Unlike public-option proposals, single-payer proposals do not typically
contemplate that residents would purchase their coverage on the state's health
insurance exchange. Redirecting ACA premium assistance tax credits to help
fund a state single-payer plan would thus require a Section 1332 waiver
regardless of how ACA requirements for qualified health plans sold on the
exchange are interpreted.

242 WHITE ET AL., supra note 92, at ix. Oregon's plan would also provide EPSDT
coverage
for all residents under age 21. Id.
243
Act 48, 2011 V.T. H.202 § 2(a)(1) (2011); id § 2(a)(5).
244
Id. § 1825(b)(1)(A) ("For individuals eligible for Medicaid or CHIP, the benefit
package shall include the benefits required by federal law, as well as any additional benefits
provided
as part of the Green Mountain Care benefit package.").
24 5
Id.

24642 U.S.C. § 1315 (2012).
247 42 U.S.C. § 1315(e)-(f).
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Vermont officials initially anticipated that federal funds would be available
24 8 In the final report on
from an ACA Section 1332 waiver pass-through.
financing options, however, officials noted that "estimates of available federal
ACA funds were downgraded significantly as we entered into actual discussions
249 implying that federal
with the federal government about such a waiver,"
officials were discouraging about the likelihood that the Obama Administration
would grant a 1332 waiver to support Vermont's single-payer plan.
If a president more amenable to state-level single-payer health care were to
be elected in 2020 or beyond, the use of ACA funds passed through to the state
pursuant to a waiver would impose coverage requirements applicable to at least
some enrollees. Given the 2016 harmonization of federal requirements
applicable to privatized Medicaid plans and qualified health plans subsidized by
the ACA, however, these requirements are unlikely to be insurmountable. There
are a few areas where ACA requirements would limit state flexibility, however.
For example, the Vermont plan noted that, in addition to covering "primary,
preventive, and chronic care, as well as urgent care and hospital services,"
Vermont legislators determined that "GMC would cover dental and
vision ...

25 0
up to age 21, as required by the [ACA]."

3. Exploring Options Under Medicare
The strategies discussed in Parts I and II do not involve tinkering with
Medicare, the federal program that provides coverage for most U.S. citizens and
permanent residents over age sixty-five and people with qualifying disabilities,
regardless of age. States typically have no role in the financing or administration
of Medicare. Thus, Medicare does not include the kinds of broad waiver
provisions that would make it possible to divert federal funding under Medicaid
and the ACA private insurance to a state single-payer plan.
There is no clear path for directing Medicare funds to a state single-payer
plan that covers residents who are eligible for Medicare. Vermont officials
initially considered relying on an unspecified combination of Medicare
provisions "to align the Medicare payment and delivery requirements with
Medicaid." 2 51 Under Section 1395b-1, the HHS Secretary may engage in
demonstration projects, including through grants or contracts awarded to public
agencies, to experiment with new Medicare payment and reimbursement
systems. 252 But Medicare demonstration projects tend to focus on particular
functions and have only rarely been led by states. Through a waiver that has
now been codified into the Medicare statute, Maryland created the first system
24 8

See GMC 2014 REPORT, supra note 220, at 4.

249 Id
250Id. at 3.

251 HSIAO ET AL., supra note 8, at 15 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1315a; 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-1; 42
U.S.C. § 1395kk-1; and 42 U.S.C. §1395jjj as possible avenues to a waiver facilitating
coverage of Medicare beneficiaries under Vermont's single-payer plan).
25242 U.S.C. § 1395b-1 (2012).
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for setting hospital rates and later moved to a system of global budgets for
hospitals. 253 The ACA, in a provision establishing payment and delivery models
for testing, allowed states to test all-payer payment reforms such as
Maryland's.254 State single-payer advocates sometimes point to the Maryland
example, but have failed to articulate how a single-payer plan might be crafted
as a Medicare demonstration project. 2 55 Under Section 1395kk, the HHS

Secretary may hire contractors to administer benefits under certain
conditions. 2 56 A state agency could qualify as a Medicare administrative
contractor, enabling it to process Medicare claims using the same system that
processes claims made under the state's single payer plan. 257 But acting as a
Medicare contractor would provide limited funds and would not give the state
control over the formulas used to calculate reimbursement rates. None of these
provisions is a clear fit for incorporating Medicare enrollees (and funds) into a
state-level single-payer plan. Vermont officials eventually determined that
residents eligible for Medicare would not participate in the state's single-payer
plan. 25 8
In theory, a state could attempt to qualify its state single-payer plan as an
alternative coverage option (subsidized by federal funds) for Medicare enrollees
under Medicare Part C, also known as Medicare Advantage. 259 Medicare
Advantage was designed to offer people eligible for Medicare the option of
enrolling in subsidized private plans. 260 These plans offer more comprehensive
financial protection than traditional Medicare, which features such onerous
deductibles and co-pays that most deem supplemental coverage necessary. 26 1
Means-tested premiums have long been a feature of traditional Medicare. Under
Part C, enrollees pay their premium to a private health plan, which also receives
a payment from the federal government on a per-enrollee basis.2 62 Ultimately,
however, the requirements applicable to Medicare Advantage plans may not be
practical for a state single-payer plan to satisfy. 263 Moreover, offering coverage
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Maryland

All-Payer Model,

CTRS.

FOR

MEDICARE

&

MEDICAID

SERVS.,

https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/Maryland-All-Payer-Model/ [https://perma.cc/82MDC4T9].
25442 U.S.C. § 1315a(b)(2)(B)(xi).
255
See
New
York
Health Act
FAQ,
CAMPAIGN
FOR N.Y. HEALTH,
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/pnhpnymetro/pages/4148/attachments/original/1 52
9527348/FederalWaiversFAQ.pdf?1529527348 [https://perna.cc/Y3WD-WNX9] ("The
Maryland waiver shows that significant changes in payment methods in a state have been
treated by CMS as compatible with the intent of the original Medicare legislation.").
256 42 U.S.C. § 1395kk-1.
2 57
See New York Health Act FAQ, supra note 255, at 4.
258 See GMC 2014 REPORT, supra note 220, at 3.
259 See New York Health Act FAQ, supra note 255, at 2.
2 60
Id at 2-3.
261 Id
2 62
See CMS HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 234, at 3; Buck, supra note 50, at 111 n.9.
263 See HSIAO ET AL., supra note 8, at 15 n.8.
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2
under Medicare Advantage requires entering into a contract with CMS. 64 A
hostile Administration could easily decline to contract with a state-level singlepayer plan, even if that plan were administered through state contracts with
private insurance companies. Alternatively, an amenable Administration could
draft new contracting guidelines that clarify the eligibility of state single-payer
plans and, of course, Congress could always add a waiver provision to the
Medicare statute to allow Medicare funds to be passed through to states via
Medicare Part C or an entirely new mechanism.

B. Developing New State Revenues
Current government health care expenditures in the United States may be
comparable to those of other countries that operate single-payer health
systems, 265 but because prices are much higher here, new revenue streams
would certainly be required to finance single-payer health care at the state or
federal level. States interested in single-payer health care need considerable
financing above and beyond what repurposed federal funds could cover. Most
266
Payroll
state proposals point to the necessity of new payroll and income taxes.
taxes paid by employers raise the specter of ERISA preemption. Both payroll
and income taxes would also need to be carefully designed to ensure that
residents and employers are not subjected to additional federal tax burdens.

1. NavigatingERISA Preemption
Private employers pay for about 20% of health care expenditures in the
United States. 267 Employer payroll taxes are thus an obvious strategy for
redirecting employers' current expenditures on health coverage for their
employees to a state-financed single-payer plan. Additionally, to achieve the
purchasing power of a true single-payer system, the state must bring the large
proportion of residents currently covered by private, employer-based insurance
into the publicly financed system. The state could do so by (1) requiring
employers to purchase public coverage for their employees, (2) imposing a
payroll tax to help fund public coverage and prohibiting employers from
offering competing coverage, or (3) imposing a payroll tax to help fund public
coverage without prohibiting employers from offering competing coverage.
Under ERISA, states are almost certainly barred from adopting the first and
second options, at least with respect to employers who self-insure. State
provisions requiring or prohibiting employers from offering health coverage
relates to employment benefits and thus would fall under ERISA's preemption
2 64

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE MANAGED CARE MANUAL
CHAPTER 11 MEDICARE ADVANTAGE APPLICATION PROCEDURES AND CONTRACT
REQUIREMENTS, MEDICARE MANAGED CARE MANUAL, § 20.1 (2007).
2 65
2 66
2 67

See Sawyer & Cox, supra notel.
See GMC 2014 REPORT, supranote 220, at 34.
See CMS HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 234, at 3.
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clause. With respect to fully insured employer benefits, a mandate or prohibition
could potentially be saved from preemption as a regulation of insurance, but no
such savings argument would be available with respect to self-insuring
employers.
Vermont officials pursued the third option. In addition to the repurposed
state and federal funds outlined above, their single-payer plan would have been
financed through a combination an 11.5% payroll tax and "income-based family
contributions" 26 8 calculated on a sliding scale from 0%-9.5% of household
income. 269 Because employers would have been subject to the payroll tax
regardless of what benefits they offered and because their employees would
have been eligible for the single-payer plan, officials assumed that 70/0--100%
of Vermonters currently covered in the small-group employment-based market
and 50/o-100% of those in large-group employment-based plans would have
migrated to the single-payer plan as their primary source of coverage. 270
Even if employers are not required to purchase public coverage or
prohibited from purchasing private coverage for their employees, imposing a
new payroll tax on employers to fund public coverage raises the possibility of
ERISA preemption. Whether a single-payer payroll tax would be preempted by
ERISA is not at all clear, though leading experts have opined that it would
not. 2

71

The payroll tax envisioned by Vermont lawmakers would apply regardless
of any choice an employer makes regarding health benefits. Its indirect
regulatory impact would thus be less clear than for a pay-or-play mandate that
2 68

See GMC 2014 REPORT, supra note 220, at 3.

2691d at 5.
2 70
Nolan Langweil, Act 48 Report Overviews, U. MASS. MED. SCH., CTR. HEALTH
L.

ECON. & WAKLEY CONSULTING GROUP, LLC. 1 (Jan. 2014), https://legislature.vermont.gov
/assets/Documents/2016/WorkGroups/Senate%2OHealth%20and%2Welfare/Health%20C
are%2OReform/W-Nolan%2OLangweil-U.MASS%20%20oWakely%2OStudy%20(Acto2O
48%20of/o202011-16-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZVG6-35TR].
271
See, e.g., Janet L. Kaminski, ERISA Preemption and State Health Care Reform, CT
GEN. ASSEM4B. (Feb. 9, 2007), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/rpt/2007-R-0131.htm
[https://perma.cc/56L3-MZHZ]; HSIAO ET AL., supra note 8, at 9-10; Patricia A. Butler,
ERISA PreemptionManualforState Health Policy Makers, NAT'L ACAD. ST. HEALTH POL'Y

17 (Jan. 2000), http://www.statecoverage.org/files/ERISA%2OPreemption%2OManual%
20for/o20State%2OHealth%20Policymakers.pdf [https://perma.cc/EHE6-5UJXA]. But see
Patricia A. Butler, What We Can Learn About FederalERISA Law from Maryland's Court
Decision, WISC. FAM. IMPACT SEMINARS 5 (2014), http://wisfamilyimpact.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/swifis24c01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KA88-KRSA]
("ERISA
preemptions become more complicated if a universal public program is financed by an
employer payroll tax. Conceivably, multistate employers might feel they are being forced to
pay twice-their own health coverage costs as well as the payroll tax. For this reason, a
single-payer plan funded by income tax (or an employee-only payroll tax) might be easier to
defend from an ERISA challenge than an employer-paid payroll tax."); New York Health Act
FAQ: The "ERISA Problem," N.Y. HEALTH, https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/pnhp
nymetro/pages/4148/attachments/original/1529527207/ERISAFAQ.pdf?1529527207
[https://perma.cc/Y3WD-WNX9].
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applies only if the employer declines to provide benefits. The state could argue
that a payroll tax is simply a financing mechanism. The fact that the revenues
would be used to provide health care coverage to all state residents could be
construed as incidental to the fundraising component of the tax. Additionally,
the carrot-only approach, whereby the state offers public coverage to all
residents regardless of whether employer-based coverage is available to them
could be seen as very different from the stick of a pay-or-play mandate.
On the other hand, employers wishing to challenge the payroll tax could
argue that its impact on ERISA plans must be considered in light of legislators'
intent to redirect employer health care spending from the private market to
public financing, while also broadening the state's risk pool by encouraging
employers to drop coverage. State lawmakers considering single-payer health
care should probably begin by focusing on the U.S. Supreme Court opinion that
is closest to being on-point. In New York State Conference ofBlue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., the Supreme Court held that a New
York law requiring hospitals to collect surcharges from patients covered by any
commercial insurer other than a Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan was permissible
under ERISA. 272 In the words of the Court: "Although there is no evidence that
the surcharges will drive every health insurance consumer to the Blues, they do
make the Blues more attractive (or less unattractive) as insurance alternatives
and thus have an indirect economic effect on choices made by insurance buyers,
including ERISA plans." 273 Because this "indirect economic influence . . . does
not bind plan administrators to any particular choice and thus function as a
regulation of an ERISA plan itself; commercial insurers and HMO's may still
2 74
Perhaps most concerning for
offer more attractive packages than the Blues."
a single-payer state, the Court cautioned in dicta that "even in the absence of
mandated coverage there might be a point at which an exorbitant tax leaving
consumers with a Hobson's choice would be treated as imposing a substantive
mandate." 275
Would a hefty payroll tax combined with the availability of public coverage
from the state "bind plan administrators to [a] particular choice"? Would it
amount to "a substantive mandate"---one that prohibits employers from offering
health benefits rather than mandating that they must do so? The federal courts'
analysis could echo the Supreme Court's analysis of whether the ACA's attempt
to impose a mandatory Medicaid expansion on states was impermissibly
coercive. Just as the ACA's drafters clearly contemplated that all, or nearly all,
states would choose to expand eligibility rather than put the entirety of their
Medicaid funding at risk,2 76 Vermont officials anticipated that 70%/--100% of

2 72

N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co, 514
U.S. 645 (1995).
273 Id. at 659.
274Id. at 659-60.
275 Id at 664.
2 76
See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 519-20 (2012).
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residents currently enrolled in small-group employer-based coverage would
transition to the single-payer plan. 277
The ERISA statute does not allow for administrative waivers-the
exemption Hawaii negotiated was written into the original statute. 2 78 If the
federal courts rule that a payroll tax to finance single-payer health care is
preempted, states will have to identify other financing mechanisms or petition
Congress to amend the statute. 279

2. Managing FederalTax Implications
A sharp increase in state payroll and income tax to finance a single-payer
plan would also need to be assessed in terms of federal tax implications for
residents and businesses. Although the amount of the state taxes could be
calibrated to ensure that, on average, households and businesses would not pay
any more for health coverage than they do under the status quo, the tax treatment
of taxes paid to the state could differ from the tax treatment of privately
purchased health benefits.
Under the 2017 federal tax reform law, state and local taxes (SALT) are
only deductible up to a statutory cap. 2 80 Commentators have noted that this
approach punishes residents whose state and local governments take a
progressive approach to taxing and spending on education, health care and other
social safety net programs. 28 1 The SALT cap does not apply to business expense
deductions, however. 28 2 Nor does it apply to the deductions individuals use to
avoid taxation of health care expenditures. 283
A report prepared for Oregon lawmakers by the RAND corporation
determined that "employer-paid payroll taxes would, like employer Federal
Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) contributions, be excluded from
employees' taxable income, which would roughly preserve the current tax
advantage." 284 Similarly, a financing report assessing the Vermont single-payer
plan noted that, "[b]ased on analysis of applicable federal law and discussions
27 7

See GMC 2014 REPORT, supra note 220, at 11-12.
278 29 U.S.C. § 1 144(b)(5)(A).
279 Such an amendment would face staunch opposition. See Bagley, supra note 118,
at
12 ("[B]ecause of the intensity of the business lobby's resistance to limiting ERISA's
preemptive scope, Congress is very unlikely to amend the law to address [state flexibility to
pursue health reform]." (footnote omitted)).
280
See Alan Rappeport & Jim Tankersley, I.R.S. Warns States Not to Circumvent State
and Local Tax Cap, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/23/
us/politics/irs-state-and-local-tax-deductions.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].For
an explanation of the SALT deduction, see How Does the Deductionfor State and Local
Taxes Work?, TAX POL'Y CTR (2016), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/howdoes-deduction-state-and-local-taxes-work [https://perma.cc/NF6S-P2MC].
281 See Rappeport & Tankersley, supra note 280.
282
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No: 115-97 (2017).
2 83
d.
284 WHITE ET AL., supra note 92, at xiv.
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with United States Treasury, the public premium would be deductible for federal
purposes on Schedule A as an income tax." 285 Individual payments would have
to be carefully structured (as premiums, rather than income taxes) to avoid
coming under the new cap on SALT deductions.
C. NavigatingFederalConstitutionalConstraints
Constitutional constraints would shape eligibility criteria for state-level
single payer plans. Under Supreme Court precedent, the state would probably
be required to open up eligibility to all current residents, regardless of the
duration of residency. Some lawmakers might prefer to impose durational
residency requirements to prevent an influx of new residents seeking immediate
health care coverage. Although the attraction of workers and businesses to the
state could be one of the benefits of adopting a single-payer plan, some may fear
that immediate eligibility could attract a disproportionate number of people who
need expensive care. Under Shapiro v. Thompson, however, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that durational residency requirements for state welfare benefits
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 286 Pointing to the fundamental right to
travel, the Court held that "the purpose of inhibiting migration by needy persons
into the State is constitutionally impermissible." 28 7
288 but
Vermont legislators considered a durational residency requirement,
ultimately Vermont's Act 48 tied eligibility to current residency, with resident
defined as "an individual domiciled in Vermont as evidenced by an intent to
maintain a principal dwelling place in Vermont indefinitely and to return to
Vermont if temporarily absent, coupled with an act or acts consistent with that
intent." 2 89

Were a state to adopt a single-payer health care plan, it would almost
certainly be challenged on other constitutional grounds, even if the state
eschewed durational residency requirements. Proponents of the fragmentary but
universal strategy embodied in the ACA were overly confident in their
assessments that the legislation would survive a constitutional challenge intact.
Proponents of single-payer plans-especially at the state level-should not
make the same mistake.
At either the federal or state level, business groups and individuals who
oppose government-sponsored health coverage could argue that the taxes
required to finance single-payer health care, the effect of government-sponsored
competition on private insurers, and the near-monopoly a government payer
would enjoy when it negotiates reimbursement rates with hospitals, physicians,
pharmaceutical companies, and other providers violate individual rights to
2 85

See GMC 2014 REPORT, supra note 220, at 43.
286 Shapiro, Comm'r of Welfare of Conn. V. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
2 87
Id at 629.
2 88
See GMC 2014 REPORT, supra note 220, at 12.
2 89
Act 48, 2011 V.T. H.202 § 2(a)(1) (2011), http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2012/Acts
/ACTO48.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ET5-X9HW].
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economic liberty. Notably, the ACA's individual mandate was challenged on
structural grounds, not based on any claim to individual liberty. The popular
conception that the government lacks authority to mandate personal choices
about health insurance has been flatly rejected by the federal courts since the
Supreme Court discredited Lochner v. New York. 290
Particularly as the composition of the Court changes with the addition of
Trump-Administration appointees, some commentators have suggested that a
return to Lochner-era constitutional protections for economic liberty is more
possible than it has been since the New Deal. 2 9 1 A challenge to single-payer
health care on the grounds that it impermissibly interferes with individual rights
could be exactly the opportunity hard-line economic conservative judges need
to reinstate economic due process.

V.

ASSESSING STATE OPTIONS FROM A HEALTH JUSTICE
PERSPECTIVE

Maximizing Medicaid expansion under existing federal law should be an
easy call for progressive states. Moreover, it is an essential component of the
other two strategies described above. Beyond that, the question of what states
should do is more complex. Assuming a strongly progressive state where voters
express a preference for collectively financed universal health care coverage,
the right path to achieving that is not entirely clear. The entrenchment of special
interests as a political obstacle will vary from state to state. The fragmentary
approach, which preserves a central and financially profitable role for private
insurers and minimizes government influence on the health care prices charged
by providers, 2 92 could be more politically viable than the alternatives. But voters
in progressive states are increasingly demanding more radical reforms that
eschew public subsidization of private profits. 293 From a legal standpoint, the
public-option and the single-payer strategies are both likely to trigger legal
challenges. There is a possibility that state legislators could carefully design a
public option that is legally defensible in the absence of federal administrative
2 90

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding 5-4 that a limitation on the hours
that bakers could work violated the freedom of contract), abrogatedby W. Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
291 Mark J. Stem, A New Lochner Era, SLATE (June 29, 2018), https://slate.com/newsand-politics/2018/06/the-lochner-era-is-set-for-a-comeback-at-the-supreme-court.html
[https://perma.cc/S4EL-9Y9L].
2 92
Gluck & Huberfeld, supranote 46.
293 John Sides, How the UnitedStates Built a Welfare Statefor the Wealthy, WASH. POST
(Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/12/howthe-united-states-built-a-welfare-state-for-the-wealthy/
[https://perma.cc/5F6V-VZGT]
("Most citizens, even educated ones, do not understand who primarily benefits from tax
subsidies. The complexity of tax expenditures makes it easier to distribute federal money to
unpopular groups such as the wealthy and corporations. And middle-class voters who use
these programs (although to a smaller degree) don't want to give up these benefits, even if
in the abstract they want the government to reduce inequality.").
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approval. But threading that needle would almost certainly require a court
judgment in the state's favor. Is it worth it for states to beg this kind of trouble?
What benefits are on the table?
How should progressive health law scholars and advocates approach the
question of whether states should take up the mantle of the ACA, supplementing
it with a public option, or pursue the more radical strategy of single-payer? For
me, the answer is that these options should be assessed from the perspective of
health justice.
In recent years, a growing number of progressive health law scholars and
294
advocates have begun using the term health justice to describe their goals.
The term certainly has different meanings depending on who is using it. My
29 5
is grounded in
own concept of health justice, developed in previous articles,
food justice
and
justice,
reproductive
justice,
environmental
of
the
the work
a central
disparities
health
eliminating
movements, each of which has made
on the
and
goal. Drawing on the experiences of other social movements,
writings of political philosophers and ethicists on health justice, I have argued
that health justice demands three commitments for the use of law to eliminate
health disparities. First, to a broader inquiry that views access to health care as
one among many social determinants of health deserving of public attention and
resources. 296 Second, to a more probing inquiry into the effects of class, racial,
and other forms of social and cultural bias on the design and implementation of
measures to reduce health disparities. 2 97 And third, to collective action grounded
2 98
in community engagement and participatory parity.
From the perspective of other competing frameworks for health law
scholarship, single-payer health care at any level of government would be
anathema. The three main alternatives to health justice are the professional
autonomy framework, the market justice framework, and the patient rights
framework. 299 The professional autonomy framework counsels that lawmakers
and judges should support the autonomy of physicians, vis-A-vis corporate
interests and the state. Single-payer health care would consolidate the
purchasing power of the state at the expense of health care providers. The market
power framework seeks to empower private commercial interests to foster
competition among health care providers to offer higher quality, lower cost care

294

jOHN COGGON, WHAT MAKEs HEALTH PUBLIC? A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF MORAL,
POLITICAL CLAIMS IN PUBLIC HEALTH 164-93 (2012).
AND
LEGAL,
29 5

See Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Law as Social Justice, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
47, 52 (2014) [hereinafter Wiley, Social Justice]; LAWRENCE 0. GOsTIN & LINDSAY F.
WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 531-50 (3d ed. 2016); Wiley,

PatientRights, supra note 29, at 834-40.
296 Wiley, Social Justice, supra note 295, at 87-95.
297Id at 95-101.
2 98
1d at 101-04.
2 99
See generally Wiley, PatientRights, supra note 29 (describing alternative health law
frameworks).
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while giving patients sufficient skin in the game to avoid unnecessary care.3 00
Single-payer health care-to varying degrees depending on the extent to which
it is administered by private contractors-saps the market of any power it may
have had to solve our health care woes. Even from the patient-rights perspective
that has historically been the bastion of progressive health law scholarship and
advocacy, single-payer health care is controversial. Putting individual patients
at the center of health law and policy assessments begs the question: which
patients? Those who currently have private employer-based coverage and the
means to cover their out-of-pocket costs with minimal impact on their standard
of living-a group that gets smaller every year? 30 1 The quality of their coverage
and the autonomy they exercise to choose providers and health plans could be
diminished under a single-payer plan. But what about those who currently lack
coverage? Those whose coverage provides insufficient financial protection?
Those who are faced with difficult choices on a regular basis, such as whether
to fill a prescription or buy groceries for the week?
From a health justice perspective that prioritizes elimination of social
disparities in health, particularly through action on social determinants, the
choice is clear. A single-payer system would overcome the stigma and political
vulnerability that plagues Medicaid and improve health outcomes at the
population level.3 02 State-level single-payer, in particular, would be more likely
to reduce health care costs, freeing up funds to address other, more important
determinants of health.30 3 Compared to federal single-payer, state-level singlepayer would also facilitate better integration of health care goals with those of
public health regulation and social safety net programs, which operate primarily
at the state and local level."
A. CombattingStigma and Reducing PoliticalVulnerability
In the United States, where the ethic of individualism teaches that
"economic success is the reward of individual virtue, while economic failure
(poverty) is an individual's own fault and reveals defect of character and lack
of virtue," recipients of social welfare benefits have long been stereotyped as
"lazy, immoral, and irresponsible." 3 05 The fragmentary system of public
insurance and subsidized private insurance relies on and reifies a "perceived
divide between good citizens with private insurance and socially undesirable
300 See, e.g., ROGER M. BATTISTELLA, HEALTH CARE TURNING POINT: WHY SINGLE
PAYER WON'T WORK 44 (2010) ("Improvements occur faster and with less acrimony when

left to market competition than if the same objectives are sought through legislative edict or
planning regulations when dealing with obstinate interest group opposition.").
301 WHITE ET AL., supra note 92, at xiv-xv.
302
See Huberfield & Roberts, supra note 14, at 8, 9-16 (discussing the stigma associated
with303
those receiving public benefits).
See infra Part IV.C.
304
See infra Part IV.B.
305
Joe R. Feagin, America's Welfare Stereotypes, 52 Soc. ScI. Q. 921, 931 (1972).
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dependents with public benefits." 3 06 The internalized stigma of Medicaid
dependence plays an important role in deterring eligible people from
enrolling, 307 and the experience of stigma during encounters with health care
providers discourages enrollees from seeking care. 308 Social stigma also
contributes to the program's political vulnerability and low reimbursement rates
for providers, which, in turn, reinforce the stigma of Medicaid by signaling to
providers that Medicaid enrollees are less deserving of attention than privately
insured patients. 309
How we finance health care is tied to "how Americans . .. think about what
ties them together and to whom they have ties." 3 10 Single-payer reform would
31 1 The
position health care as a collective, rather than individual, responsibility.
universality of a single-payer system would reflect a belief in the dignity and
worth of all residents and the notion that our shared vulnerability to illness and
injury warrants an obligation to provide mutual aid. 3 12
B. Improving Health Outcomes
If the ultimate purpose of a health care system is to improve health
outcomes, single-payer financing has many advantages. Relative to a federal
single-payer plan, a system of state single-payer plans offers additional
advantages. In particular, a state-level approach offers greater opportunities to
harmonize the goals of the health care system with those of the public health
system, public health regulations, and other social welfare programs that
influence the social determinants of health.
Studies of the impact of Medicaid coverage on health outcomes demonstrate
modest improvements by most criteria. 3 13 These findings are unsurprising to
anyone familiar with the reams of evidence demonstrating that social factors
3 06
Huberfield & Roberts, supra note 14, at 8; see also Maher, supra note 106, at 143
(arguing the U.S. health system's reliance on employer-based coverage "perpetuate[s]
mistaken beliefs about who deserves health insurance (and thus health care)").
3 07
See Jennifer Stuber & Karl Kronebusch, Stigma and Other Determinants of
Participationin TANF and Medicaid, 23 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 09, 526 (2004).
3 08
See Heidi Allen et al., The Role ofStigma in Access to Health Carefor the Poor, 92
(2) MILBANK Q. 289, 301-04 (2014) (describing an instance where a newly insured
individual felt judged for being previously uninsured, and therefore did not follow up with
her new physician).
309
See Huberfeld & Roberts, supra note 14, at 12-13.
310 Deborah A. Stone, The Strugglefor the Soul ofHealth Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 287, 289 (1993).
3 11

See LAURA KATz OLSON, THE POLITICS OF MEDICAID 240 (2010).

3 12

See Stone, supranote 310, at 290-91.
See Julia Paradise & Rachel Garfield, What Is Medicaid'sImpact on Access to Care,

3 13

Health Outcomes, and Quality ofCare?Setting the Record Straighton the Evidence, KAISER

FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 2, 2013), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/what-is-medicaidsimpact-on-access-to-care-health-outcomes-and-quality-of-care-setting-the-record-straighton-the-evidence/view/print/ [https://perma.cc/N7VJ-MVNP].
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other than access to health care-such as safe, healthy, and affordable housing,
safe drinking water, access to nutritious food, and other social support
systems-play a far greater role in determining health outcomes. 3 14 Yet, for
various reasons-including the greater susceptibility of health care spending to
be captured by politically powerful interests and the fact that the lives public
health and social spending saves are rarely identifiable-public health and
social safety net spending are dwarfed by spending on medical care. 3 15
Through various mechanisms, public health advocates and policymakers
interested in cost-savings are attempting to hold health care providers
financially responsible for the health outcomes of the populations they serve.
Value-based payment ties reimbursement rates to outcomes and new strings
attached to hospitals' tax-exempt status require them to assess community
health needs and take steps to address them. 3 16 These efforts have supported a
longstanding reorientation of clinicians toward preventive medicine. 317 But
health care providers have not yet adopted the population perspective of public
health, probably because fragmentary health care financing means their
incentives are not well aligned with long-term population health goals. 3 18 The
health care system is driven by the needs of paying patients over the period of
an annual budget, while public health must serve the needs of the entire
community-especially its most vulnerable members-over the full lifecourse. 3 19 Chances are slim that the insurance company that decides how much
a pediatrician is paid to talk with a vaccine-hesitant parent about her concerns
will be the same company responsible for the costs of treating an infant who is
infected by the unvaccinated child of the hesitant parent. There is virtually no
chance that the insurance company that determines how much a health care
provider is paid to treat a 14-year-old boy's nicotine dependence will be
responsible for his health care costs if he develops cancer forty years later.
Moreover, there is a limit to the political influence of health insurance
companies and employers over more powerful tools such as school vaccination
laws, tobacco taxes, advertising restrictions, and disclosure requirements.
3 14

GosTIN & WLEY, supra note 295, at 533-34.
See id at 443, 542 (discussing the role of politically powerful interests and the
unidentifiable lives problem in public health); Frakt, supra note 3 (discussing low U.S.
spending on social programs excluding health care relative to other similarly wealthy
countries); David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, Public Health's FallingShare of
US Health Spending, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 56, 56 (2016) (finding that "public health's
share oftotal health expenditures rose from 1.36% in 1960 to 3.18% in 2002" when spending
briefly surged in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, "then fell to 2.65% in 2014," a decline of
17%).
3 16
See Lindsay F. Wiley, The Strugglefor the Soul ofPublic Health, 41 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 1083, 1084 (2016).
3 15

3 17

3 18

See id

See id at 1083-87 (discussing how health care providers are approaching prevention
by looking at outdated models focusing on influencing individuals to change their
behaviors).
3 19
See Wiley, PatientRights, supra note 29, at 852.
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By eliminating (or dramatically reducing) fragmentation in health care
financing, single-payer health care could better align incentives between the
health care and public health systems. Vermont lawmakers identified "[s]hifting
the focus of care from intervention to prevention and wellness" as an explicit
goal of their proposal. 320 But the potential to promote prevention and wellbeing
extends beyond the health care setting. Under a single-payer system, there
would be near-total overlap between the primary payer for health care goods
and services (taxpayers) and those who exercise control over the most crucial
social determinants of health (voters). 32 1
Federal single-payer health care could prompt further federalization of other
social safety net programs and public health law. The linkage between growing
federal subsidization of health care and federalization of interventions to address
the social determinants of health is readily apparent. For example, the ACA
included calorie labeling requirements for chain restaurants and artificial
tanning taxes, as well as a significant infusion of funds for community
prevention. 322 Federalization may pull more progressive jurisdictions back
toward a national mean. Preemption of state and local menu labeling laws by
federal requirements weakened requirements in some jurisdictions, for
example. 323 Federalization also tends to align public health priorities more
closely with national security priorities, a linkage that prompts wariness among
324
most public health advocates.
State and local governments exercise primary responsibility for public
health. 325 They also exercise primary authority over most of the social net
326
State-level singleprograms that shape the social determinants of health.
payer health care would allow for better harmonization of health care and public
health goals, giving state taxpayers and voters greater control over both.

C. Lowering Health Care Costs
Excessive spending on health care relative to public health and other social
services is one of the factors that distinguishes the U.S. from other similarly
situated countries. 32 7 Because health status is largely determined by factors
320

HSIAO ET AL., supra note 8, at 3.

321 See id. at 3-6 (using health care reform in Vermont as an example).
322
Gwendolyn Roberts Majette, PPACA and Public Health: Creatinga Frameworkto
Focus on Preventionand Wellness andImprove the Public's Health, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
366, 373-75 (2011).
323
See James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Public Health Preemption: ConstitutionalAffronts to
Public Health Innovations, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 685 (2018).
324
See Nan D. Hunter, "Public-Private"Health Law: Multiple Directions in Public
Health, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 89, 90 (2007); Lindsay F. Wiley, Adaptation to the
Health Consequences ofClimate Change as a PotentialInfluence on Public HealthLaw and

From Preparednessto Resilience, 15 WDENER L. REV. 483, 505 (2010).
Policy:
32 5
GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 295, at 87.

326 Id. at 283
32 7
See Sawyer & Cox, supra note 1.
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other than access to health care, improving health outcomes requires controlling
health care costs. 32 8
Beyond increasing access to health care for all residents, one of the primary
benefits of a single payer system is negotiating power to lower costs while
maintaining participation by providers. Single-payer systems have significantly
lower administrative costs (encompassing all of the operating costs of the health
care system other than payments to providers for clinical services). 329 Overhead
costs are lower for health care providers (who save the time they otherwise
spend navigating the requirements of multiple payers) and profits for payers are
eliminated, at least to the extent that lawmakers eschew reliance on private, forprofit contractors. 3 30 Payments to providers for clinical services are also lower
under a single-payer plan than the public option 33 1 or fragmentary but universal
strategy. 332 Health care economists generally assume that shifting to a singlepayer system would increase patient demand for services. On the other hand,
the impact of increased demand for services would likely be offset by the
superior negotiating position of a single payer, leading to a reduction in the price
of services 333 in addition to lower administrative costs. 3 34
A single-payer system built on Medicaid could look quite different from a
system built on Medicare. Medicare's reimbursement rates fall in between those
adopted by private insurers and those adopted by state Medicaid plans.3 35
Medicare's network of participating providers is superior to that enjoyed by the
average private insurance enrollee, which in turn is better than the network of
providers willing to accept the average Medicaid plan. 336 On the other hand,
Medicaid's actuarial value-the financial protection from out of pocket costs
that it affords to enrollees-is considerably higher than that of private insurance
or Medicare. 33 7 Indeed, traditional Medicare's actuarial value is so low that
32 8
32 9
33 0

33 1

See Frakt, supra note 3.
See WHITE ET AL., supra note 92, at xiv-xv, 11.
See id at 11.

See id at xi (assuming for the purposes of analysis that under Oregon's public option
proposal, provider rates would match Medicare fee-for-services rates).
33 2
See id. at x (projecting that under the "Obamacare-for-All" plan under which state
and federal funds would be pooled to subsidize private health insurance for all state residents,
provider rates would be "slightly below the rates paid by commercial plans in the Status Quo
but are higher on average than under the Status Quo")
333 See, e.g., id at x (assuming that Oregon's purchasing power as nearly-single payer
would result in a 10% reduction in the price of clinical services).
334

33 5

Id atxiv-xv.

See MANATr HEALTH, supra note 92, at 3.
See GRETCHEN JACOBSON ET AL., KAISER FAM. FOUNDATION,
ADVANTAGE: How ROBUST ARE PLANS' PHYsICIAN NETWORKS? 4 (2017).
33 6

33 7

MEDICARE

See Sophie Beutel et al., Realizing Health Reforms: How Much FinancialProtection

Do MarketplacePlansProvide in States Not ExpandingMedicaid?, COMMONWEALTH FUND

(June 2016), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/documents/media
filespublications _issuebrief 2016jun_1881 beutel financial_protectionmarketplace-p
lans rb v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQ3Y-6CWR]
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almost all enrollees purchase supplemental insurance or receive it via Medicaid
or as an employment or retirement benefit. 3 38
As a platform for establishing a single-payer plan, Medicaid could be in a
better position to save costs through lower reimbursement rates. Medicare
reimbursement rates are established at the federal level, via complex formulas
339
that take geographic variations in overhead and labor costs into account.
Traditional Medicaid reimbursement rate formulas are determined by each state
pursuant to federal guidelines and approved by CMS. 340 As discussed above,
however, the majority of Medicaid enrollees are now covered by private
Medicaid managed care plans, which establish their own reimbursement
rates. 34 1 On average, however, Medicaid pays prices that are about two-thirds
of what Medicare pays. 342
A state developing a single-payer system will face massive political
pressure to adopt reimbursement rate formulas that are considerably more
generous than current Medicaid rates. 34 3 Vermont officials, for example,
assumed that initially, uniform reimbursement rates paid by the single-payer
system would rely on Medicare's formulas (fee-for-service for most physician
care and prospective payment based on diagnosis-related groups for hospital
care), but keyed to a higher baseline payment than Medicare uses. 344 Over time,
however, they envisioned the state-run system transitioning away from fee-forservice and prospective payment toward risk-adjusted capitation payments that
34 5
shift some financial risk to providers and reward them for better outcomes.
Would the network adequacy problems-and resulting barriers to accessing
care-experienced by people currently covered by Medicaid continue if
Medicaid absorbs a larger share of the population, including those who are
relatively healthier and better off financially? Would universal access to
Medicaid change the political calculus and lead to higher reimbursement rates?
Politics drive reimbursement rates for publicly administered coverage. And
reimbursement rates plus the payer's market share drive network adequacy.
33 8

See generally Lipschutz et al., supra note 200 (discussing consumer protections but
in place for those enrolled in Medicare, which highlights the limited coverage of Medicare
in some areas).
339

See MEDICAID AND CHIP PAYMENT AND ACCESS (MACPAC), Medicaid Physician

/

6 4
2
Payment Policy 2 (Apr. 2016), https://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/ 01 /0
[hereinafter
Medicaid-Physician-Payment-Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PU7-56XD]
MACPAC].
34 0

See id. at 3.

341 See supra Part I.B.
34 2
See MACPAC, supranote 339, at 3-4.
34 3
See HSIAO ET AL., supra note 8, at 7 (reporting economic analysis predicting that
"[a]ny measurable reduction to the total amount paid to hospitals could jeopardize the
survival of Vermont hospitals" and "stakeholder analysis [indicating] that hospitals would
mobilize all their political strength and support to oppose any reduction in the total amount
paid to hospitals").
344 See id at x.
345

d.
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Of course, it is entirely possible that a U.S. single-payer system-at the state
or federal level-would ultimately bear little resemblance to the limitedeligibility program touted as its platform. 34 6 Medicare for All has gained
traction, but it is unclear whether a federal single-payer plan could-or shouldbear much resemblance to Medicare. 34 7 Some state legislators have even taken
to referring to their state-level single payer plans as Medicare for All. 348

D. Proceedingwith a Cautious Eye Toward the Disadvantagesof StateLevel Single-PayerHealth Care
Although there are many potential advantages of transitioning to a singlepayer plan at the state level, lawmakers must exercise caution in undertaking
such a momentous shift. Critics of single-payer health care warn that it could
reduce access to care even as access to coverage becomes universal.349 In
addition, pioneering single-payer at the state level could exacerbate geographic
disparities in health between states with universal coverage and those
without. 35 0 In addition, state-level single payer would result in a system where
protections for the state's residents under federal law continued to be
fragmented, depending on the resident's status under Medicare, Medicaid, and
the ACA. 35 1 Finally, depending on how the state proceeds, state-level singlepayer could also put the vulnerable populations currently covered by Medicaid
at risk by moving the program closer to private insurance or Medicare and
further from the special coverage Medicaid was designed to provide for special
populations.

1. ExacerbatingNonfinancialBarriersto Care
Reducing provider reimbursement rates would eventually lead to a
reduction in the supply of physicians, hospital care, and other services that
currently command prices far higher than those seen in other wealthy
countries. 3 52 For example, an analysis of Oregon's single-payer proposal by the
RAND Corporation assumed that a 10% reduction in the price of clinical
services (achieved through the state's enhanced negotiating power) would lead
34 6

See Ed Kilgore, Medicarefor All Won't Bring Medicareto All, N.Y. MAG. (July 13,
2018), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/20 18/07/medicare-for-all-wont-bring-medicare
-to-all.html [https://perma.cc/W7R5-GTZL].
347 Id.
34 8

See e.g., Press Release, Carl E. Heastie, Speaker, N.Y. State Assemb., Assembly
Passes New York Health Act (June 14, 2018), http://nyassembly.gov/Press/files/201806
14.php [https://perma.cc/FP89-ZL3Q] (quoting the sponsors of the single-payer bill
approved by the New York Assembly referring to the plan as "Medicare for All").
34 9
See infra Part IV.D. 1.
3 50
See infra Part IV.D.2.
351
See infra Part IV.D.3.
3 52
See WITE ET AL., supranote 92, at xiv; Sawyer & Cox, supra note 1.
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to a reduction in the volume of services supplied. 353 A reduction in supply
would, in turn, result in nonfinancial barriers to care, such as longer wait times
354
Longer wait
or the need for patients to travel longer distances to access care.
times and the need to travel longer distances could discourage residents from
seeking needed care. 355 A state's increased negotiating power may result in
more providers participating in a state-level single-payer or public-option plan's
3 56
But if there
network than currently participate in the state's Medicaid plan.
are fewer health care providers in the state overall (because they move to other
jurisdictions where reimbursement rates are higher or because fewer residents
decide to become physicians or operate health care businesses), access to care
could suffer.

2. ExacerbatingGeographicDisparitiesin Health
In 2013, prior to implementation of the ACA's Medicaid expansion, there
was a nearly "six-fold difference" between the state with the lowest uninsured
3 57
In the aftermath
rate (Massachusetts) and the state with the highest (Texas).
of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in NFIB v. Sebelius rendering the
358
If
expansion optional, the coverage gap from state to state has widened.
a
public-option
pioneering states are able to achieve universal coverage through
or single-payer plan, the gap would widen even more.
Health outcomes are heavily determined by geography. 3 59 Social
epidemiologists have documented the many ways in which the places where a
person works, lives, and attends school shape her likelihood of living a long and
healthy life. 360 Most of this variation is probably due to social determinants that
extend well beyond access to health care. But some of it may be attributable to
policies that dictate access to insurance coverage. Single-payer and publicoption waivers could ultimately result in wealthier states (with more progressive
politics) doing more to provide access to coverage for their own residents, while

353 White et al., supranote 92, at xiii-xiv.
354

Id. at xiv.

35 5

See Ronald M. Andersen, Revisiting the Behavioral Model and Access to Medical
Care:Does It Matter?, 36 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAv. 1, 3 (1995).
356 Oregon officials are considering an approach that "would require providers who
participate in other state health programs (including the Oregon Health Plan and any plans
offered to public employees) also to participate in the Public Option." WHiTE ET AL., supra
note 92, at xi.
357 David C. RADLEY ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, AIMING HIGHER: RESULTS FROM
THE COMMONWEALTH FUND SCORECARD ON STATE HEALTH SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 13

(Mar. 2017), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/fund-report
/2017/mar/1933 radleyaiming higher_2017_state scorecardfinal v3 03_15_2017.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/8GMA-FNMT] ("23% in Texas vs. 4% in Massachusetts").
358Id at 10.
3 59
GosTIN & WILEY, supra note 295, at 534.
360Id
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their interest in protecting Medicaid programs in poorer, more conservative
states wanes.
3. ContinuingFragmentaryFederalProtectionsfor State-Level Single-

PayerEnrollees
Even if nearly all state residents are covered by the same payer, the rights
of state single-payer enrollees under federal law would still be fragmentary,

depending on their eligibility for various federal programs. 36 1 As discussed
above, enrollees who fall within traditional Medicaid eligibility categories
would be entitled to the full protections of Section 1902 of the SSA. 3 62
Depending on the contours of the state's 1332 waiver, those for whom the state
receives ACA premium assistance tax credits could be entitled to receive
Essential Health Benefits. 363 Others-particularly those from middle- and
higher-income families who were covered by employer-based plans prior to
opting into the state's single-payer plan, would receive very little protection
under federal law. 364

4. PuttingFederalProtectionsfor the Highest-NeedPopulationsat Risk
The ACA's reliance on Medicaid as one piece of a universal coverage pie
is controversial among some Medicaid advocates. Historically, expansions in
eligibility to adults without disabilities and those living in higher-income
households has been accompanied by increased privatization, managed care,
and cost-sharing. 3 65 These changes have diminished Medicaid's traditional
focus on providing special coverage for special populations, while still
preserving core protections for enrollees. 366 A shift toward relying even more
heavily on Medicaid as a platform for buy-ins by higher income residents or for
a single-payer plan would raise similar concerns. 367 Would negotiations within
the state (between lawmakers and private insurers, health care providers, and
other stakeholders) and between the state and the federal government (where the
same stakeholders could put pressure on the administration to protect their
interests) result in a greater role for privatization, managed care, and cost
sharing? What about in conservative states where a public option might be
explored as an alternative to expanding Medicaid under the ACA, a move that
361 Cf Sidney D. Watson, Out of the Black Box and into the Light, Using Section 1115
Medicaid Waivers to Implement the Affordable Care Act's MedicaidExpansion, 15 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICs 213, 219-20 (2015) (describing a specific example of
fragmentary application of benefits depending on federal program eligibility).
362
See supra Part II.B.
363
36 4

See MANATT HEALTH, supra note 92, at 4.

See supra Part III.A.2.
Watson, supra note 361, at 219.
36 6
See id at 220-21.
36 7
See Lay & Hermndez-Delgado, supra note 189, at 3.
36 5
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Medicaid advocates have opposed? 36 8 Vermont officials considered a singlepayer option that would have been entirely administered by public employees,
but a state-commissioned report led by Dr. William C. Hsiao recommended an
alternative that would have "preserve[d] a small space for private insurance
firms by contracting out, through a competitive bid process, the claims
administration and provider relations functions of the single payer." 369 This
public-private partnership, Hsiao and his coauthors suggested, would be the
"most feasible [option] as it is likely to be accepted by the broadest cross-section
of Vermont stakeholders." 3 70 The other states have not yet gotten far enough for
us to know whether their Medicaid for All plan would have in fact been a private
managed care organization (or dozens of them), a publicly-run plan, or some
combination of the two. Similarly, the roles of cost-sharing and managed care
practices (such as utilization review and risk-sharing with providers) have not
yet been addressed in full by any of the states examining single-payer or publicoption proposals. Lawmakers and administrative officials considering the role
of these powerful tools must strike a delicate balance between deterring overutilization of high-cost, low-value goods and services and preventing underutilization of lower-cost, high-value care that could prevent greater expense and
suffering down the road.
VI.

CONCLUSION

If single-payer health care is ever to become a reality in the United States,
it will very likely be pioneered by a state government, much like Canada's
single-payer system was first adopted in the provinces. 3 71 A single-payer system
entirely financed and administered by the U.S. federal government would be
unprecedented in its scale. Canada's system operates more like U.S. Medicaidfinanced nationally but administered largely by the provinces-than U.S.
Medicare. The U.S. Medicare program already covers more people than the
largest single-payer system in the world. 372
3 68
3 69

See id.
HSIAO ET AL., supranote 8, at xii.

370Id. at xviii.
371 Jacalyn Duffin, The Impact of Single-Payer Health Care on Physician Income in
Canada, 1850-2005, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1198, 1199 (2011).
372 U.S. Medicare currently covers nearly 60 million enrollees. CMS Fast Facts,
CMS.Gov (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/
[https://perma.cc/J953-PXRG].
Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/CMS-Fast-Facts/index.html
Britons are covered by separate single-payer systems for England, Northern Ireland,
Scotland, and Wales, administered by the Parliament of the United Kingdom, the Northern
Ireland Assembly, the Scottish Government, and the Welsh Assembly Government,
respectively. About the NHS, NHS (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.nhs.uk/using-thenhs/about-the-nhs/the-nhs/ [https://perma.cc/6CJK-V86P]. The National Health Service in
England covers 54.3 million enrollees. Id As noted above, Canadians are covered by singlepayer systems jointly financed and administered by the federal and provincial governments,
but even if there were a national single-payer system in Canada, the entire Canadian

898

OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 79:4

States seeking to pioneer single-payer health care face complex legal
obstacles. Although it might be possible for a state to proceed without the
acquiescence of the federal executive or the support of the federal Congress, it
is probably not feasible. Thus, single-payer proponents may have to wait until
an amenable president is elected in 2020 or beyond, or until Congress comes
under the control of progressive Democrats-with the former being the more
likely of the two scenarios. In the meantime, there are steps interested state
lawmakers and executives can take to prepare. Maximizing Medicaid eligibility
within existing federal law ensures affordable coverage for non-immigrant
residents living in low-income households. It also increases the number of state
residents whose coverage by a state-level single-payer plan could ultimately be
subsidized by federal Medicaid funds. Strengthening the ACA exchanges
supports subsidized private coverage to residents who are not eligible for
Medicaid but lack access to employer-based care. It also sustains a platform for
offering a public option to some or all residents, which could make coverage
more affordable while bolstering the political will required for more radical
reforms.
The health justice framework would provide a better grounding than
alternative health law paradigms for the legal interventions that would be
required to implement state-level single-payer health reform. To determine that
state authority to levy a payroll tax to finance a single-payer plan is not
preempted by ERISA, federal judges could rely on the longstanding authority
population is just over 35 million. Census Program, STAT. CANADA (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://wwwl2.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/index-eng.cfin
[https://perma.cc/PJH9H24E]. The populations of other countries with single-payer systems are far smaller: Taiwan
(about 23.7 million) Sweden (about 10 million), Denmark (about 5.8 million), Norway
(about 5.4 million), and New Zealand (about 4.7 million). Countries in the World by
Population, WORLDOMETERS, http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/populationby-country/ [https://perma.cc/59L9-Y69A]. Only mainland China and India have larger total
populations than the United States. Id. The New Rural Co-operative Medical Care System
in mainland China subsidizes basic health care for about 802 million people living in rural
areas (urban residents are not eligible), but it is jointly financed and administered by the
central government and localities, with benefits and reimbursement varying across hundreds
of local governments. Lidan Want et al., Who Benefitedfrom the New Rural Cooperative
Medical System in China? A Case Study on Anhui Province, BMC HEALTH SERvs. RES. 16

(2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4893416/ [https://perma.cc/7XR8TUA7]. In 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced a plan to cover health
care costs for people living in about 100 million low-income households up to an annual cap.
Vidhi Doshi, India JustAnnounced a Vast New Health InsuranceProgram.But Can It Afford

It?, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asiapacific/indiajust-announced-a-vast-new-health-insurance-program-but-can-it-afford-it/2018/02/01/805
efb46-0757-11e8-ae28-e370b74ea9a7_story.html
[https://perma.cc/5UCL-5NN4].
"Modicare," as the plan is known, would also be jointly financed and administered by the
central government, states, and union territories, which are given the option of relying on
private insurance companies or public administration. Will 'Modicare'Be a Game Changer
for India?, KNOWLEDGE AT WARTON (Oct. 8, 2018), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
article/will-modicare-game-changer-indial [https://perma.cc/4T59-N84K].
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of states to protect the public's health, pursuant to police powers that have not
been ceded to federal lawmakers. 3 73 Courts cognizant of the health justice
framework should be especially reluctant to infer that ERISA was intended to
preempt a state's authority to tax and spend for the public's health. To approve
1115 and 1332 waivers for state-level single-payer health reform, an amenable
administration would have to determine that the state's single-payer plan would
promote the objectives of Medicaid and the ACA. Lawyers for the state and
HHS could rely on the health justice framework to emphasize that Medicaid and
the ACA were intended to promote population health and uniquely public
interests, including interests in eliminating health disparities, apart from the
individual rights of the programs' current beneficiaries. Health justice
advocates, focused on integrating the health care and public health systems to
eliminate disparities and improve population-level health outcomes, stand ready
to assist with meaningful state-level reforms.

3 73

See GosTIN & WILEY, supra note 295, at 87-88; Janet L. Kaminski, ERISA
Preemption and State Health Care Reform, CT GEN. ASSEMB. (Feb. 9, 2007),
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/rpt/2007-R-0131.htm [https://perma.cc/S95G-J3VQ]; HSIAo
ET AL., supra note 8, at 10.

